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Peace is the fundamental right for every human being. This observation has motivated this 
research. The study deals with the root causes of the Angolan conflict, gains and shortcomings.  
The failed peace accords are presented. The study looks at the reasons behind the failures of 
Bicesse in 1991 and Lusaka in 1994.  
Lastly, the Luena accord in 2002 is looked at. The research investigates the current situation 
by enquiring mainly from the grassroots how they feel the current peace, negative or positive. 
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ABSTRACT AND KEY TERMS 
  
  
The 2002 ceasefire agreement in Angola represented an unprecedented achievement as far as 
building peace is concerned. With the belligerents able to talk, the country had a great 
opportunity to embark on a full reconciliation process. However, the situation in the country is 
in the status of unresolvedness. The peace is still negative. There are no avenues for open 
dialogue for positive change. This thesis presents the various phases of the Angolan peace 
process, its shortcomings and success. Further, a suggestion for a full framework for Angola 
based on John Paul Lederach´s Integrated Framework for peacebuilding is given for the 
Angolan grassroots to embark on peace process starting from the bottom.   
The researcher selected 200 hundred respondents with experience of the war. One hundred 
from Kuito- Bié and the other hundred from Viana. Through snowball and purposive sampling 
participants were identified.  
Furthermore, the researcher interviewed with one member of MPLA, one from UNITA, one 
from the civil society and one from the Catholic Church.  
The results showed that the civil society is not satisfied with the current peace, and urges for a 









KEY TERMS: Conflict, Peacebuilding, Lederach´s Integrated Model, Dialogue, Change, 
Reconciliation, Forgiveness, MPLA, UNITA.  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Angola is a southern African country which was colonized by the Portuguese. The first 
Portuguese personnel arrived in 1482. They were in the country for almost five centuries.   
In 1961, the Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Movement for the Liberation 
of Angola (MPLA) liberation movements started fighting for independence, and later on the 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) joined the fight.  These movements 
fought for decades for independence, and 1975 independence was achieved.  
The years that followed independence were marked by mistrust and antagonism. As a 
consequence a war broke out. For 27 years the country suffered the consequences of a war that 
was caused by unwillingness to share power in a country coming out of colonial domination.  
During the war period, many attempts were made for a peace settlement. Bicesse in 1991 and 
Lusaka 1994 were a failure because the MPLA and UNITA were unwilling to compromise 
their own ambitions. Through the years of searching for peace, there were many contributors 
that tried to broker peace for Angola. The troika, (a combination of United States of America, 
Russia and Portugal) mediated the process of Bicesse in Portugal. The UN had an informal role 
to play. The negotiators rushed the country into elections. In 2002 elections were held. The 
main contestants were MPLA with José Eduardo dos Santos and UNITA with Savimbi. The 
polls did not favour UNITA. The MPLA won. Savimbi refused to accept the results, and amidst 
the confusion the war resumed.  
In 1994 another attempt in Lusaka resulted in nothing. The UNITA was urged to demobilize 
its army and play as a normal political party. Savimbi and UNITA beat around the bush and 
war returned. In 1998 the government decided to launch a war for peace. Helped by the UN 
sanctions against UNITA, they could fight against a fragmented movement. The result was a 
defeated UNITA that had no other solutions but to settle for peace. A cease-fire was signed and 
UNITA militants were granted amnesty for the war crimes.  
With the victor´s peace, UNITA became weak and the MPLA got stronger. As such, UNITA 
militants were living like MPLA hostages, it was like they were saved by MPLA´s goodwill.  
What came out of this process was a fragile peace that could not be monitored. For the MPLA, 
the achievement of a cease-fire was sufficient. The road towards common healing and 
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reconciliation was not on the agenda. The party narrowed down the reconciliation framework 
to forgive and forget.  
As a result of the relativism as far as the peace process is concerned, the relative “peace” in 
Angola is negative. People’s needs are not met, people are living in fear. The possibility of 
talking about the future is very limited.  
Overall, there is no clear framework for peace building. The idea of journeying towards 
sustainable peace is a dream. As much as people are confident the country will not go back to 
war, currently there is a lot of discontent and anger.  
Thus, this research has been an attempt at bringing across a framework based on Lederach´s 
(1995; 1997; 2005) work on peace building. The aim was to bring about a framework that will 
prevent violence and favour rebuilding of relationships.  
The study underlines that current situation in the country is of a victor’s peace, it is a one man 
takes all situation. The closing of ways for togetherness hinders the rebuilding of broken 
relationships. The aim of a peace process should be constructive social change. To move from 
fear to love, from despair to hope, from suffering to joy.  
The research was both quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative side dealt with grassroots 
through questionnaires. Respondents from Kuito-Bie and Viana were asked about their war 
experience and peace expectations. Everyone acknowledged the need for dialogue as a way of 
mending broken relationships and moving towards a desired future.  
The interviews (qualitative side) dealt with leaders from political parties, a member from 
UNITA and one member from the MPLA and one civil society representative and one Church 
representative. The interview questions were aimed at understanding the reasons behind the 
failure of the Bicesse and Lusaka accords and the likelihood of a successful 2002 Luena peace 
agreement. All the respondents agreed that there is a need for a clear roadmap for 
peacebuilding. Currently there is nothing in place to prevent conflict.  
The current chapter 1 presents the reasons behind this research and points the reader to the 






1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
 
The study took place in two Angolan municipalities. Kuito-Bié and Viana. An enquiry of the 
situation of the current peace process was sought.  The study showed that the road towards 
peace has been a long one, many accords and talks took place in many countries as a way of 
helping UNITA and MPLA, the warring political parties to reach an understanding. The first 
of these attempts, after independence, took place in 1989 in Gbadolite, an encounter   organized 
by president Mobuto of the Republic of Zaire. The gathering bore no fruit.  The second 
happened in Bicesse, where a peace accord was reached, but collapsed after elections in 1992. 
After the collapse of Bicesse, there were many attempts to return to a cease-fire. The worrying 
parties met in Addis-Abeba and Abidjan in 1993 this various talks under the supervision of the 
United Nations led to the signing of the Lusaka protocol in 1994.  
All the above mentioned accords failed due to mistrust amongst the political parties. The 
country went back to large scale conflict in 1998 when the Angolan government decided to 
declare a war to achieve peace. 
The main problem is that the current peace is elusive. Peace can only be effective if a whole 
society embarks on seeking solutions and avenues to interaction and change. 
Two municipalities were investigated as a way of getting an indication of people´s perceptions 
on peacebuilding processes and the peace aspiration. The study took place in the context of 
post-war reconciliation. The urgency of breaking the chains of past memories represents a key 
turning point into the desired outcome the country needs to reach.  
Angola is currently facing an economic crisis due the low prices of crude oil in the international 
market. As a consequence, prices of basic goods are too high and common citizens have no 
buying power. Under severe life conditions there is a need for a clear road map for peace 
building, otherwise the grassroots can become a source of social unrest.  
 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
After an armed conflict there are a number of tasks to be undertaken for peace building. The 
2002 peace agreement in Angola, symbolizes advancement in people’s lives, yet there are still 
problems to solve. How can peace become social? How can the 2002 agreement be changed 
into an opportunity for integration? Which framework can better fit the Angola post war 
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period? These are main problems of the current study. Finding a better suitable peace 
framework was the challenge undertaken.  
 
1.3. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
 
The purpose of the study was to understand how civilians perceive the current peace process.  
After the enquiry, which has clearly shown that the current peace agreement has led the country 
to negative peace, Lederach´s integrated framework for conflict transformation is suggested as 
way forward for the country. Thus the research asked the following questions:  How is the 
population embracing the current peace? What are the priorities and needs of civilians affected 
by the armed conflict? How does the population sense security and protection after the armed 
conflict? Is dialogue necessary to improve the current situation? 
 
1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The study was motivated by the lack of an existing clear process for the Angolan situation. 
Since the signing of Luena Memorandum in 2002, the process is at a stalemate. The researcher 
found it important to embark on a study which would suggest a clear way for peace building.  
 
By suggesting Lederach´s framework as a method for an integrated peace system, the research 
contributes to the loophole in the Angolan peace process. It is was observed, that there is very 
little literature on peacebuilding initiatives from below – the bottom-up approach.  The 
researcher acknowledges that peace in never achieved at once. It is a sensitive process and 
requires patience from all sides so that a peace process becomes sustainable.   
 
1.5. SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
 
The study limits itself to the 25 years of the struggle to attain peace, that is, from 1991 to 2016. 
This period is also divided into two sections, from 1991 to 2001 as the conflict era, and from 
2002 to 2016 as the post conflict era. In the first period the investigation aimed at understanding 
the reasons behind the failure of the peace accords. From 2002 to 2016 the aim was to 
understanding the trends of conflict transformation in the country. The focus was in Kuito-Bié, 
because it was badly affected by the war, and in Viana, an area that was not directly affected. 
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The aim was to find out how much importance they give to dialogue as a method for peace 
building.  
 
1.6. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY  
 
The researcher found it challenging to interact with people because of political sensitivity. Most 
public institutions are affiliated to MPLA, most people do not like to talk about politics, mostly 
when they belong to an opposition party. This difficulty can be shown on the data about 
political affiliation as most of the respondents avoided that question, which challenged the full 
picture of party support.   
 
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 
 
This research is made up of seven chapters. The second one is a literature review. This chapter 
2 is based on the published literature on peacebuilding. The aim is to refer to already existing 
literature and then build up with specific peace aspects with respect to Angola.   
Chapter 3 presents the trend of conflict transformation in Angola. The history behind the 
conflict is brought to light, as well as the challenge of the current situation. It concerns the 
current president who has been in since 1979 at the centre of many challenges affecting the 
post-war Angola. 
Chapter 4 presents the research methodology. The way through which the researcher went 
through to collect data and its interpretation is looked at.  
Chapter 5 is the presentation of results. Both the qualitative and quantitative research results 
are presented. 
Chapter 6 discusses the results from the research. A consideration of the important trends in 
the Angolan conflict is carefully presented. 
Chapter 7 presents the recommendation and general conclusion. Combining both the discussion 
and the recommendations the research asserts that if Angola has to prosper it has to pay 




CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
Theories are designed to guide a research to a desired outcome. A well designed theory helps 
to structure a research mapping guide. Mehtha (2016:1) asserts that “theories are constructed 
in order to explain, predict and master a phenomenon”. The choice of a theory is determinant 
for a validity of a research, Mvumbi and  Ngumbi (2015:60) define theoretical framework as 
“an appropriate tool that is used to explain and bring together all the arguments and statements 
made in a research”. This chapter will therefore provide the theoretical framework for the 
current study. In the chapter, a set of theories are presented. Peace and Conflict Research (PCR) 
uses a number of approaches to understand and intervene in conflict situations, but a special 




Angola´s peace process lacks a transformational theory. As already mentioned Angola was at 
war for 27 years. Peace was achieved in 2002. After the signing of Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding, amnesty was granted to the belligerents. While the amnesty helps to stop 
revenge and massive killing, it hinders the possibility for true reconciliation. This chapter 
considers relevant theories that can be applicable in the Angolan context as a way of starting a 
true transformation process.  
The Angolan peace process is perceived to be a disintegrated one. The civil grassroots is not 
active in the process and also there are still deep rooted conflicts in the society. The clashes 
show themselves through the political intolerance between UNITA and MPLA partisans. There 
is a culture of culpability of past events.  
There are a number of theories that address the issue of integrated peace-building processes. 
These will be mentioned briefly before the focus of this research which primarily used John 
Paul Lederach´s (1997) Integrated Framework for Conflict Transformation towards 







2.1.1-AFRICAN UNION POLICY ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (PCRD) 
 
The PCRD aims at creating a secure environment for the affected state and its population 
through juridical statehood, defined and controlled territory, responsible and accountable state 
control over the means of coercion, and a population whose safety is guaranteed (AU, 2006). 
Thus, the PCRD sets the roots for the peace agenda in the continent, however, more specific 
theories are applicable in Angola.  
2.1.2-PRACTICE-RESOURCE MODEL 
 
Another important theory for the proposed study is the Practice-Resource Model. The model 
is an anthropological approach to peace studies. It defines peace building as the creation of 
sociopolitical structure which is able to prevent the outbreak of conflict and perpetuate peace 
(Oda, 2007). The Practice-Resource Model favours bottom-up peace building. This approach 
allows for peace practices by non-state actors using various resources to create amicable 
relationships with national, ethnic, racial, religious and political others, and to build a social 
structure which is able to create a political order and which is able to promote sustainable peace 
(Oda, 2007). 
 
2.1.3- CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE BUILDING 
 
Given the road Angola has travelled to achieve peace, it would also have been appropriate to 
study the Angolan peace process from the point of departure of the Contingency Framework 
for Peace building.  
As Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe the failure of peace agreements can be attributable 
to the parties’ unwillingness to adhere to the provisions of that particular agreement and their 
willingness to resume conflict in order to forcefully get their way. They also note that literature 
suggests a variety of factors that ensure that negotiated settlements achieve what they were 
agreed upon to achieve, which is in most instances the end to conflict and the realization of 
peace. Such factors include the environment in which the agreement is negotiated, international 
security guarantees, provisions for political and military power sharing and the level of which 
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the agreement is specific and not drawn in vague terms that are open to many interpretations 
(Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). 
The contingency framework integrates features of structure, process and environment of 
conflict management and assesses the nature of the process in light of historical experience and 
what is expected of the process (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). According to the framework, 
whatever the outcome of the negotiation, in terms of whether they manage to reach an 
agreement there is a total failure to reach an agreement, it can be assessed in terms of the nature 
of the conflict, the attitude of the mediators and the environment in which the conflict exists. 
The contingency framework deals with the past, present and the future aspects of conflict 
management and mediation and through this analysis we can assess the durability of the 
agreement. The reason behind this kind of analysis, as Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe, 
is to put mediation efforts in the context where their outcomes are considered in light of the 
above mentioned factors.   
In as much as the contingency framework allows for an examination of cases where mediation 
was used as a mode to reach an agreement that brings an end to conflict, it does not consider 
the post-conflict consequences of mediation. The framework does not provision for how third 
parties who are part of the mediation process can help to implement the agreement. In order to 
fully appreciate the implementation of such agreements, the environment for implementation 
is considered under three factors namely how specific the agreement is, third party guarantees 
as well as how the conflict is managed in order to ensure that the agreement is implemented 
successfully (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). With regard to third party guarantees, the 
presence of a peace keeping force, for example, can be instrumental in ensuring that the 
agreement is not violated.  
2.1.4- PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY  
The contingency approach fails to outline strategy after mediation. Preventive diplomacy, on 
the other hand, gives a full view on how to go about conflict prevention. As put by Lund, quoted 
by Wokoma (2004:1) preventive diplomacy is “action taken in vulnerable places and times to 
avoid the threat or use of armed and related forms of coercion by states or group or settle the 
political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and 
international change”.  Currently, Angola is experiencing an economic meltdown, a fragile 
government, thus preventive diplomacy is appropriate for Angola, given that it prevents 
recurrence of armed conflict by looking at different segments of a society.  
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2.2-LEDERACH’S CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK 
 
Albeit above mentioned theories would suffice for the study, how Lederach’s conflict 
transformation framework is privileged because it reduces the limitations of peace-building 
and increases the likelihood of sustainable peace. Thus, conflict transformation has the merit 
of shifting the focus of conflict and peace studies to local actors.  This study will focus on local 
actors.  
Lederach (1997:79) suggests that peace-building is a process. He asserts that “[the] process 
underscores the necessity of thinking creatively about the progression of conflict and the 
sustainability of its transformation by linking roles, functions, and activities in integrated 
manner”. Furthermore, Lederach’s (1997) peace-building framework represents a 
comprehensive set of lenses for describing how conflict emerges, evolves, and brings about 
changes in the personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions. His approach to peace 
studies aims at transforming conflict into peaceful cohabitation. Thus an integrated approach 
that includes every segment of the affected society is sine qua none for the effectiveness of a 
peace-building process.     
Lederach’s levels of leadership provide an insight into Angola’s negative peace. He makes use 
of a pyramidal system to outline different peace actors. At the top of the pyramid there are the 
high rank members of a society. This segment of the society approaches peace by focusing on 
high levels of negotiation, such as ceasefire. Then there is the middle level, composed of 
religious leaders, academics and intellectuals. This component of the pyramid approaches 
peace-building through problem-solving and peace commissions. The last level of the pyramid 
is the grassroots leadership, composed of local leaders and community developers. They 
approach peace through psychological recovery (Lederach, 1997).  
Lederach’s approach to peace-building will enlighten the current situation of the Angolan 
peace-building process, by asking whether the different aspects of an integrated framework 
have been observed after 13 years of peace accords. 
 
2.2.1-LEDERACH´S INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING  
 
Lederach explains his model of peace building in the context of the kinds of conflict that are 
prevalent in present day. Pete (2004) observes that these are divided into long-lasting conflicts 
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and ethnic intrastate conflict usually arising from differences in tribe, community and religion. 
This presents a shortcoming, in that the focus of the model cannot be applicable to in situations 
where the conflict exists between states or where the conflict arises due to the military 
intervention of a third party state in an attempt to restore order between the two conflicting 
states or in situations where the occurrence of conflict is real but it has not yet intensified to 
the point of open violence. However, Pete (2004) notes that Lederach’s model of peace 
building provides a unique perspective to conflict transformation. 
Sabur (2011) on his part observes that Lederach makes reference to conflict transformation as 
compared to conflict resolution because the transformation view alerts the parties to the conflict 
to their role in what caused the conflict and its results thereafter. This involves all the parties 
to the conflict from the grassroots to national party leaders and this process becomes a tool to 
ensure that community members take responsibility for what transpired during the conflict and 
encourages them to build sustainable peace. He says that Lederach’s notion of conflict 
transformation ensures that people come together and, with the aid of their cultural diversity, 
achieve self-sustaining peace. He sees that Lederach believes that conflict cannot be controlled 
or abolished but it can be transformed and through such a transformation, relationship between 
previously conflicting parties can be mended (Sabur, 2011).  
Lederach and Maiese (2009) point out that in every attempt to ensure sustainable peace, the 
starting point is presenting the situation.  This includes taking a look at what caused the conflict, 
how the conflict could have been dealt with before the eruption of violence and the nature of 
the relationships of the conflicting parties. The notion of conflict transformation immediately 
seeks to address the challenges that need to be resolved as a matter of urgency. Then it seeks 
to identify destructive patterns that worsen the situation. This enables people to connect what 
is happening to what happened in the past. This stage includes the involvement of all the parties 
to the conflict including the people at grassroots because it provides a clear picture of 
relationship patterns which would have led to the conflict (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). It is 
however important, that in as much as this stage brings forward the current situation and how 
decisions and actions made in the past resulted in the occurrence of conflict, it does not change 







The second point of consideration is attempting to build sustainable peace. According to 
Lederach it is the horizon of the future that the process has consider in order to attain a desirable 
outcome. In this stage, all the parties to the conflict including people from the grassroots are 
asked what they envision for the future. They are expected to express the kind of future they 
want for themselves (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). The present situation provides a motivation 
for the kind of future that all the parties want to embrace and most of these include the end of 
conflict and building sustainable peace. This stage looks back to the past to see what went 
wrong and assesses the immediate challenges that have to be addressed in order to be on the 
path of achieving the desired future.  
2.2.3-STRATEGIC PLAN  
 
Lederach and Maiese (2009) observe that the final inquiry is the formation of strategy and 
support for the change to be experienced from conflict to peace process. This stage seeks to 
consider the response to the conflict as the development of change processes which include the 
needs, relationships and action plans for the parties involved in the conflict. However, although 
the focus of this stage is to address immediate challenges and put in motion attempts at 
addressing broader challenges, there is a need to contemplate on more than one operational 
solution. In this way, the change process will provide platforms for people, especially in the 
grassroots and enable them to stimulate long-term sustainable peace (Lederach and Maiese, 
2009). Hence, Lederach’s model of peace building through conflict transformation enables the 
parties to a conflict to foresee the possibilities of a peaceful future even though they may still 
be in conflict and encourage them to take the steps away from the conflict towards   build and 
achieve long-lasting peace.     
Lederach´s framework shows that peace takes time to build.  When a conflict turns violent, 
there is need for a commitment to achieve positive peace. It is said that it takes as long as a 
conflict took to build peace.  
The study found out that the current peace in Angola is negative, it resulted from a cease fire 
and less is being done to tackle the root causes of the conflict. The country still witnesses the 
effects of negative issues to be resolved. There is still intolerance and rivalry between divided 
political parties, meaning that there are still core problems to be solved. Peace building 
12 
 
becomes a reality when parties in a conflict deal with the deeper feelings, such as resentment, 
hatred, revengeful behaviour and aggression and decide to move on (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000).   
Lederach´s relational integrated framework best suits the Angola process because it aims at 
restoring relationships over time. For him (2003:14) “conflict transformation is to envision and 
respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating 
constructive change that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social 
structures, and response to real-life problems in human relationships”. This definition informs 
us that to understand a conflict, there is a need for the existence of a mapping guide.  
To map a conflict, it is a requirement to know the history of the conflict, context, parties 
involved, the respective dynamic and issues of concern. Mapping a conflict is an important 
step towards building sustainable peace. By knowing the root causes of a conflict, a strategy 
can be put in place to address unresolved issues in relational conviviality. Lederach (2003:17) 
points out that “relationships-visible and invisible, immediate and long-term, are the heart 
transformational processes”.   
Building peace for Lederach therefore, is interconnected with strengthening relationship in a 
society. Thus there are some key concepts he uses in order to better explain his approach to 




It could be perceived that conflict is an inherent energy for human life. Without conflict 
humanity is meaningless. The eternal challenge is to avoid the appearance of violent conflicts. 
“Conflict is the motor of change, that which keeps relationships and social structures honest, 
alive and dynamically responsive to human needs, aspirations and growth” (Lederach, 
2003:18).  
Africa has experienced a varied number of violent conflicts. Over decades countries in the 
continent have been ravaged by recurrent complex intrastate wars. External intervention has 
produced insignificant lasting peace. Very often, quick solutions are sought. The possibility of 
transforming violent conflict into peaceful cohabitation is hard to achieve.  
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Conflict is inevitable in societies, but when they turn violent, there is a need to transform it into 
peaceful event. Angola needs a complete moral trajectory at peace (Obiekwe, 2009).  The 
absence of war does not mean peace (Galtung, 1969).  
 
2.2.5-THE IMPORTANCE OF LEDERACH’S APPROACH 
 
Leaderach’s breakthrough is the importance he gives to human relationships as way of building 
peace. Recognizing where a society is as far as peace is concerned, and designing a structural 
plan for true peace is technique that requires time. His main concepts help society to see each 
as part of common solution for a given problem.  
 
 
2.2.6- THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE 
 
The unique constant reality in human life is change. Just as conflict is always present, change 
journeys with everyone´s life. Conflict and change are interconnected. A change can be positive 
or negative depending on the desired outcome. In conflict transformation, the desired outcome 
is always positive. As pointed out by Obiekwe (2009:9) “… conflict transformation as an 
endeavour to transform and channelize social conflict to produce or support positive dynamic 
growth and stability to prevent the undesired and undirected effects of conflict from reaching 
a critical point of tension that affects peoples”.  For Lederach (2005:2) “… constructive social 
change is the pursuit of moving relationships from those defined by fear, mutual recrimination, 
and violence toward those characterized by love, mutual respect and proactive engagement”. 
 
2.2.7- CENTRALITY OF RELATIONSHIP  
 
Reconciliation is a key concept in Lederach´s peace building framework. “Reconciliation is a 
behaviour process in which we rebuild trust in a relationship and work toward restoration” 
(Lulofs and Cahn, 2000:326). At the centre of peacebuilding is the preoccupation of 
ameliorating broken relationships over a long period of time and formulate a strategic vision. 
For Lederach (1997:xvi) “… building peace in today's conflicts calls for long-term 
commitment to establishing an infrastructure across the levels of a society, an infrastructure 
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that empowers the resources for reconciliation from within that society and maximizes the 
contribution from outside”.  
 
2.2.8- THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CONFLICT  
 
A conflict is neither bad nor good, it what is done with it that characterizes its badness or 
goodness. In other words, conflict is a result of interaction of individuals or groups with 
different cultural orientation, and values.  Thus, conflict is part of any society. Lederach defines 
social conflict as “… a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships. It is 
a phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs, and indeed its 
very creators. It is a necessary element in transformative human construction and 
reconstruction of social organizations and reality” (Ledearch, 1995:17). 
Lederach spouses a methodology for peacebuilding that is linked to the restoration of human 
relationships. The above mentioned elements are essential parts to his concept of building 
peace. Furthermore, he underlines that for peace to be effective different groups of a society 
have to work in web of connection, otherwise peace becomes a challenge.  
To elucidate his point, Lederach suggest a relational pyramid aiming at changing the structure 
of conviviality in a divided societies and suggests a more subsidiary type of social relationship.  
Lederach´s framework “… focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships and 
engaging the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding” 
(1997:24). The reworking of relationships take place in the pyramid. There are three important 
levels in the pyramid: Top level, middle range, and the grassroots. In the top level - leadership 
are the main negotiators. The middle range are in between the grassroots and the top levels.  
The grassroots is at the bottom of the pyramid. They are the ones who suffer the most during 
conflicts. And continue to suffer after ceasefire and are often left out of the picture as far as 
peace is concerned   (Lederach, 2007).  
At this point we turn to literature to find out the main determinants of peacebuilding after 
intrastate conflict. Later, at the discussion session we return to Lederach’s integrated 




2.3-PARADIGMS OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
 
In broad terms, the main objective of all international relations theories is the regulation of the 
international system of states in a bid to maintain peace as security, order or justice (Bercovitch, 
1984). Realism maintains that a balance of power is brought about by a common understanding 
among states that the international system is aged and that states are driven by self-seeking 
motives rather than idealistic norms (Paffenholz, 2009). Idealism, on the other hand, as 
Paffenholz (2009) points out, observes that the world would function smoothly if states were 
subject to the regulation of international organisations, norms and standards. Peace building in 
reality therefore connotes the maintenance of stability in the world through hegemonial power 
and keeping state interests clearly defined (Paffenholz, 2009) while peace building in idealism 
refers to the achievement of peace in the world through the creation, acceptance and 
observation of international norms and standards under the regulation of international 
organizations.   
Specht (2008) notes that there are different approaches in the consideration of peace building. 
These include conflict transformation, conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict 
resolution and prevention (Specht, 2008). In as much as all these approaches are relevant to 
conflict transformation as a whole, these need to be aided by other interventions which would 
seek to assess the underlying reasons for the conflict. Specht (2008) provides the example that 
in any given instance conflict resolution would focus on addressing attitudes and building 
positive relationships between the parties who were in conflict; in the same breath conflict 
transformation would then focus on addressing and hopefully changing the whole context of 
the conflict.  
Dijk (2009) states that the main aim of conflict transformation is to achieve peace. The aim is 
not to merely end violent acts or merely transform a negative relationship between conflicting 
parties but rather a transformation of the social, political and economic aspects which may be 
the underlying cause of the initial conflict. Therefore, Dijk (2009) suggests that conflict 
transformation must be aimed at equipping people so that they can become involved in the 





2.3.1- STAGES IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
 
Lederach and Maiese (2009) provide the components of the conflict transformation framework 
and point out that each stage is an investigation in developing a response to conflict. The stages 
include the presenting situation, the horizon of a preferred future and the development of the 
change processes linking the two. Lederach and Maiese (2009) observe that the transition from 
the world we live in today to the world in which we desire to live in can be achieved through a 
set of initiatives which inspire change and establish platforms to practice long-term change. 
As universally agreed it is not ease to transform an undesired situation to a more desired one, 
as Reychler and Langa (2006:4) put it: “… transforming conflict-torn, political unstable, and 
socially and economically disintegrated countries into more politically stable, equal and 
prosperous ones require not only a clear and legitimate vision of the peace, or future one wants 
to achieve, but also a clear understanding of how to get there”.  
Thus to address the conflict situation envision a desired outcome there is a need to acknowledge 
the various time frames in conflict transformation.   
 
2.3.2- THE PRESENT SITUATION 
 
The first point of the investigation will be the consideration of the presenting situation and this 
looks at the conflict itself which will provide the context into the reason behind the conflict the 
manner in which differences of opinion are expressed which in turn lead to the conflict 
(Lederach and Maiese, 2009). This leads to the questions which need to be addressed at this 
stage. Such questions include what concerns would need immediate resolutions in order to stop 
the conflict. What needs to be considered in order to change the destructive patterns of dealing 
with the conflict? In this stage transformation views the presenting issues as being expressions 
of a broader system of relationship patterns. These issues will usually have strong connections 
with the past and will present a context on how things have been, how the conflict arose and 
the expressions of the parties to the conflict. This stage however, does not have the capacity to 
reverse what has already transpired (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). Therefore, the potential for 
change is in the ability to recognize and accept what has already occurred and to establish new 




2.3.3- THE HORIZON OF THE FUTURE 
 
The second point of the investigation is the horizon of the future and this suggests the kind of 
future in which we aspire to live.  This stage asks us questions about what we would ideally 
like to see created or to be in place. It is noted that this is by no means a linear model of change 
but rather a movement from what we presently experience to future desired experiences 
(Lederach and Maiese, 2009). This leg flows from the first one in the sense that for there to be 
a desired future, there has to exist a present that requires changing.  Therefore, the arrow of 
transformation will point forward to the future in which we wish to live and back to where we 
are coming from (Lederach and Maiese: 2009). Hence the process of transformation can be 
perceived as both a circular and linear process.  
 
2.3.4- CHANGE AS PROCESS  
 
The third point of the investigation is the design and support of change processes. This stage 
requires us to look at the responses to conflict as developments of change processes which have 
an effect on interconnected needs, relationships and patterns (Lederach and Maiese, 2009). It 
will also consider immediate concerns and a broader analysis of patterns and so it would be 
important to look at multiple levels and types of change instead of focusing on one solution 
that seems to work. Therefore, it follows that the change processes must come up with short-
term solutions and also establish platforms which promote long-term change (Lederach and 
Maiese, 2009).  
Dijk (2009) considers the social aspect of conflict transformation and suggests that the social 
aspect is central to conflict transformation. According to Dijk, three closely connected aspects 
have to be considered in the process of conflict transformation. These are the perceptions and 
attitudes of people, the context in which people live and the behaviour of people. Perceptions 
and attitudes influence how a group of people are going to behave and examples of such are 
distrust, superiority or the opposite. Context looks at the circumstances under which people 
live and examples of these will include whether or not there is equal access to basic services, 
the availability of economic opportunities and the ability to participate in the political processes 
(Dijk, 2009). Context influences perceptions. Behaviour is the consequence of a group of 
people’s perceptions and attitudes as well as the context in which they live and examples of 
behaviour include violence and corruption (Dijk, 2009).  
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In summary of what conflict transformation is and what it entails, Lederach and Maiese (2009) 
state that the whole process of conflict transformation allows us to come up with responses for 
immediate concerns, while providing those responses with a platform for long-term change. 
This involves the capacity to not only address the immediate problems but to look beyond these 
problems and create responses that address real issues in real time (Lederach and Maiese, 
2009). 
Peacebuilding is a long and structured process that needs to be taken seriously and 
methodologically. One of the processes that allows for avenues for peace is dialogue, a catalyst 
that helps broken relationships to be amended. The next section presents the significance and 
importance of dialogue for peacebuilding.  
 
2.4. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIALOGUE IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
 
The process of building peace after a history of conflict and striving to ensure that the reasons 
for the initial conflict are guarded against is a challenging task (Samuel and Einsiendel, 2004). 
Studies show that among some of the challenges that are encountered, the most daunting in the 
process of peace building are inadequate strategy, lack of co-ordination and the unwillingness 
to compromise (Samuels, 2005). In as much as these studies point out to the challenges on 
building sustainable peace, Samuels (2005) observes that there is very little clarity on how such 
issues can be addressed. For example, it is difficult to ensure human security in an environment 
which is still riddled with conflict or to disarm those who were fighting for various sides before 
a ceasefire was reached or to even integrate them into a single army successfully (Samuels, 
2005). However, mediation and dialogue remain the main facets in which peace during conflict 
and sustainable peace can be achieved (Mirimanova, 2009). 
This section will consider the role that dialogue plays in a bid to achieve sustainable peace. 
The notion of conflict which is the reason why parties sue for peace will be discussed. 
Thereafter, a discussion of what dialogue is and what it entails will ensue.  
 
2.4.1- CONFLICT AS A PART OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Nicholson (1971) defines conflict as a situation where there is an interaction between two or 
more parties whose motives for doing something differ. Galtung (1996), on the other hand, 
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views conflict as a triangle which has structure, attitudes and behaviour as its facets. The 
structure is the situation which is the conflict of differing interests which arises between the 
parties. Attitudes are how the parties view the conflict which is usually from their own point 
of view and lacking consideration or understanding for the concerns of the opposing parties. 
Behaviour refers to actions by deed or communication which will be hostile or conciliatory 
towards the opposing party (Galtung, 1996). Coser (1956) defines conflict as a struggle over 
matters such as values, claims to status, power and scarce resources and the intentions of the 
parties would be not only to have these but also to eliminate any opposition to their claims.  
From these definitions, it is clear that conflict is an inevitable occurrence in human 
relationships. Emuedo (2013) observes that conflict can be peaceful or violent. Girvetz (1974: 
185) views violence as "… harm perpetrated on persons or property ranging from restriction 
of movement, torture and death (persons), and from simple damage to total expropriation or 
destruction". Therefore, it follows that conflict is violent when there is the use of force and 
arms in a bid to resolve differences (Francis, 2006). The reason why conflicts tend to turn 
violent is the frustration which stems from anger or worry over why a particular point of view 
is being disregarded or regarded (Emuedo, 2013).  
In the midst of the conflict, there will be attempts to bring it to an end and to achieve peace. In 
the Angolan context, these came in the form of the Alvor accords in 1975, the Bicesse accords 
in 1991, the Lusaka peace agreement in 1994 and Luena peace agreement in 2002. It is 
important to note that even though peace may be achieved through such attempts, it is of 
paramount importance to ensure that steps are taken to preserve the peace. Dialogue is one such 
step and this chapter will at this juncture turn to consider it in greater detail. 
 
2.4.2- DIALOGUE AND WHAT IT ENTAILS 
 
Mirimonova (2009) observes dialogue and mediation to be longstanding strategies for conflict 
resolution. Both principles are grounded in the notion that whenever parties are in a conflict, 
the best way to assist those parties to reach an understanding or common ground there must be 
intervention from a neutral third party. Therefore, mediation and dialogue appear to be fair, 
cost-effective and a democratic means to resolve conflict as opposed to arbitration or military 
intervention by an outside party (Mirimonova, 2009).  Mediation and dialogue can be employed 
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in the context of violence, distrust, political opportunism and injustice as a means to address 
and resolve such ills. 
 
2.4.3- DIALOGUE AS AN OFFICIAL ENCOUNTER  
 
Dialogue is viewed as open communication between parties in conflict which can either be 
facilitated or moderated by an impartial third party in a bid to bring about mutual recognition, 
understanding and trust (Mirimanova, 2009). The ultimate goal of dialogue is to improve the 
understanding between parties with conflicting views and to build a mutual trust between those 
parties. Casual conversation, discussion or debate by conflicting parties cannot be considered 
as dialogue for the simple reason that for dialogue to happen, communication between the 
parties has to occur according to particular rules, where the parties acknowledge and develop 
compassion towards each other’s points of view (Mirimanova, 2009). Therefore, dialogue 
focuses on the process but it can also be result oriented. Mirimanova (2009) observes that this 
may occur when the conflicting parties have one particular goal, for example the exchange of 
prisoners of war. Such a goal cannot be achieved in the absence of trust and empathy between 
the conflicting parties.    
Official dialogue is dialogue between parties whose members or their delegates hold top rank 
that include decision making responsibilities. These persons generally include leaders of states 
or leaders who represent interested groups such as rebel leaders. Unofficial dialogue is usually 
termed as public peace processes or problem solving workshops and can be defined as the 
interaction between members of conflicting groups who attempt to influence public opinion 
and develop strategies in a bid to resolve the conflict (Mirimanova, 2009). This form of 
dialogue arises from the weariness of talking with no visible change and these have had 
influence in conflict transformation, human rights and development.  
 
2.4.4- INFORMAL DIALOGUE  
 
Unofficial dialogue processes are as important as the official processes in that these usually 
continue after the official dialogue process has either collapsed or ended in the reaching of a 
mutual understanding. Without unofficial dialogue, there is also a danger of top ranking 
officials reaching an agreement which will not be accepted by the masses leading to the 
outbreak of conflict (Mirimanova, 2009). The government’s power to negotiate with a 
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conflicting power emanates from the notion that the agreement reached will be to the benefit 
of its citizens and unofficial dialogue processes bring awareness to the government of what its 
citizens want and what they will likely accept after negotiations with a conflicting party.   
Dialogue and justice reinforce each other and promote reconciliation. Whether it is official or 
unofficial dialogue, the end result is to reach a common understanding between conflicting 
parties. The unofficial dialogue process feeds into the official dialogue process and in these 
processes the needs of the citizens are clear and are taken into consideration in any negotiation. 
Therefore, in the development or transition of any state, the importance of dialogue whether it 
is the official or unofficial process cannot be overemphasized.  
 
2.5. THE ROLE THAT DIALOGUE PLAYS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
 
There have been many instances of conflict in Africa and Angola gives a perfect example of 
the challenges and the lessons that can be learnt in bringing about an end to such conflict. 
However, the end of the conflict usually has to be consolidated with a well thought out plan 
for peace-building after the conflict. Kumar (1998) observes that in as much as international 
organizations and governments have intervened in many instances to bring an end to many 
violent conflicts around the globe, it has been their main objective to establish a conducive 
environment for peace which guards against the occurrence of conflict again.  
Kumar (1998) further points out that those attempts to ensure sustainable peace for the short or 
long term, whether they are domestic or international, attempts will not yield any tangible 
results if there are no sustainable political processes in place. He goes on to note that such 
processes should operate in such a way as to be able to manage and resolve disputes before 
they turn violent and result in the outbreak of conflict. Therefore, in the absence of such 
processes, recovery from conflict to building sustainable peace will be disturbed by disputes, 
some of which could cause the occurrence of another conflict notwithstanding the amount of 
international support in place for reconstruction and development.  
 
2.5.1-DIALOGUE AS A PROCESS  
 
Dialogue is one of the processes which can be incorporated into political systems in order to 
ensure sustainable peace. For LeMoyne (2009) dialogue is a process that not only entails 
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talking but learning too. Dialogue is an attempt to change or to improve the way people talk 
and communicate with each other regardless of their differences and this requires elements like 
reflection, inquiry and being open to ideological changes to be present (LeMoyne, 2009). 
Therefore, through the process of dialogue, parties will be open to discuss the root causes of 
their differences and not merely how they are reacting to such differences. This would ensure 
meaningful people in the short-term as both sides would have an idea of the stance of the other 
and through dialogue they would attempt to understand the conflicting party’s stance in a bid 
to prevent violent conflict. 
LeMoyne (2009) observes that not only does dialogue show empathy for the other party but 
also focuses on long-term goals. If parties are engaged in dialogue, they tend to acknowledge 
their differences and accept areas of common ground. Dialogue differs from other forms of 
processes in ensuring sustainable peace whereas other processes may focus on addressing short 
term challenges whilst dialogue tends to focus on symptoms of differences and in order to do 
so, both parties need to be patient (LeMoyne, 2009).  The downside to this is that the process 
is time consuming and is filled with trial and error solutions to the point that once-off 
interventions are virtually impossible.  
 
2.5.2- MUTUAL TRUST AS PRE-CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL DIALOGUE  
 
For the process of dialogue to ensure sustainable peace and to be successful certain conditions 
first have to be present. LeMoyne (2009) states that where there is a history of violence, hate 
and mistrust, such as in the case of Angola, the road to peace building and sustainable peace 
becomes more challenging even where the process of dialogue has been instituted. Moreover, 
the parties have to be free to voice their concerns without fear for their lives. Therefore, 
dialogue can be considered to be just one of the tools for policy-makers in a way to ensure 
sustainable peace. Other flexible and adaptable tools have to be employed along with dialogue 
for parties with a history of conflict to learn to trust each other and to collectively focus their 
efforts on peace building.  
In conclusion, in order to ensure sustainable peace one of the tools that policy makers ought to 
make use of is dialogue. Dialogue can either be official where the relevant stakeholders are top 
ranking government officials with the capacity to make decisions or unofficial where the 
stakeholders are organizations and concerned citizens who through their dialogue can inform 
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and influence decision making. Both of these avenues are paramount in peacebuilding. 
However, as already discussed, the process is time consuming and requires parties and 
prerequisite conditions for it to be effective. Moreover, dialogue is not a once-off solution but 




When dialogue is successful, what follows are steps towards full reconciliation. In fact, 
dialogue and reconciliation go hand in hand. When parties accept to dialogue means they have 
started to reconcile. “Reconciliation is of vital importance for the success of sustainable peace 
building. Reconciliation releases the necessary energy to build a new future. It requires the 
cooperation of the conflicting parties” (Langer and Reycheler, 2006:34).  
 
2.6.1- IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION  
 
Reconciliation is of paramount importance in that it is a process which focuses on restoring 
relationships between conflicting groups after a cease-fire has been reached (Steele, 2008). 
Brouneus (2007) observes that this process is vital in this day and age considering that most 
conflicts are intrastate and when the parties agree to end the conflict, former enemies, 
perpetrators and victims will still have to continue residing near each other. Steele (2008) notes 
that reconciliation requires action in all stages which begin with the stabilization process and 
must be initiated from national to local levels in the political as well as social aspects. 
Therefore, reconciliation can be viewed as the tape that holds a society emerging from conflict 
together long after the ceasefires have been reached.  
This part will focus on the concept of reconciliation. It will unpack what reconciliation entails, 
investigate how the process of reconciliation is carried out and most importantly, it will 






2.6.2- THE IMPORTANCE OF RECONCILIATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 
 
Literature suggests a variety of definitions of reconciliation depending on what perspective one 
takes in looking at it. It could be from a religious or political or even psychological perspective. 
Brouneus (2003) views reconciliation as a process whereby parties involved accept the 
wrongdoings of the past and acknowledge their role in the events, in a bid to build lasting 
relationships which ensure sustainable peace. From this definition by Brouneus, one can 
deduce that the central components to the process of reconciliation are a change in emotions, 
attitude and behaviour. It is a process that involves the society at large (Bloomfield, 2006). 
Molenaar (2005) notes that reconciliation is a process. It cannot be realized at once because it 
takes time to forgive the wrongdoings of the past and to attempt to rebuild sustainable 
relationships between previously conflicting parties. The parties to a reconciliation process are 
usually parties which have a negative history and there is usually no clear difference between 
the wrongdoer and the victim. Molenaar (2005) is of the view that restoration of a relationship 
is the ultimate goal for the reconciliation process and this goal cannot be achieved unless all 
the affected parties are actively involved in the process.   
Brouneus (2007) points out that in most post-conflict societies there are situations where peace 
and justice dialogue. This is because it is common place for leaders who were previously in 
conflict to reach peace agreements in return for amnesty. By the same token, weak security, 
imbalanced power-sharing arrangements and unwillingness of political institutions have a 
tendency of limiting the scope of achieving justice. Brouneus (2007) points out that victims in 
post-conflict societies may be angry if no one is called to acknowledge or held accountable the 
atrocities perpetrated against them and achieving sustainable peace can be a challenge if peace, 
justice and other development priorities have to compete for resources.    
With this in mind, Steele (2008) points out that reconciliation must encompass the needs of all 
the parties concerned in order to help them to deal with their differences. Only then can there 
be reconciliation. In order for the process to be effective, there is a need to address all the 
dimensions to a conflict which include people, challenges and systems, all of which come with 
their own challenges (Steele, 2008). There also needs to be mechanisms in place in order to 
establish trust, healing of grievances, doing away with biases and stereotypes and building 
relationships so that people can live and work together in harmony. Additionally, people should 
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have problem solving skills which are necessary to help them resolve their disputes amicably 
(Steele, 2008).  
Kumar (1999) points out that social reconciliation intervention is designed specifically to 
develop understanding among the involved parties in order to strengthen nonviolent conflict 
resolution and to heal wrongdoings of the past. The main objective of this is to promote social 
reconciliation not to promote economic or political development. It is here that there is a need 
for grassroots structures which include peace committees, citizens’ groups and local leaders to 
be part of the process in order to ensure tolerance among all the parties involved. Tolerance is 
achieved through countering rumours and exaggeration, encouraging non-violent means to 
resolve disputes, awareness of peace education and mediation between conflicting groups and 
the government (Kumar, 1999).  
 
2.6.3- WHAT THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION ENTAILS 
 
In the past years, reconciliation has come to be viewed as a medium employed in post-conflict 
societies to guard against the reoccurrence of conflict. Brouneus (2007) observes that it was 
predominantly the work done by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa 
which sought out reconciliation after it emerged from decades of apartheid through truth 
commissions, official apologies and memorials that inspired the initiation of the process in 
other post-conflict societies in order to achieve sustainable peace. Therefore, reconciliation has 
become a priority in national development for such societies and several countries like Peru, 
Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rwanda and Liberia have initiated reconciliation mechanisms (Brouneus, 
2007). 
Steele (2008) points out the necessity of reconciliation noting that if there are ineffective 
mechanisms for dialogue and dispute resolution, it is impossible to build harmonious 
relationships between previously conflicting parties. He also points out that several other 
challenges may arise as a result, these include a deadlock in the attempts of establishing 
democratic governance, threats to security arising from suspicion, stagnation of economic 
development due to other competing developmental priorities and an interpretation of justice 
in negative terms like guilt and punishment instead of common values for the common good 
(Steele, 2008).   
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Backer (2007) notes that since reconciliation seeks to change the behaviour, attitude and 
emotions between previously conflicting parties, truth telling is the backbone of the process. 
Literature in peacebuilding and in politics suggests that the telling of the truth is therapeutic 
and healing, thereby speeding up the process of reconciliation between former enemies. 
However, Backer (2007) points out that there is not empirical evidence of this. Hamber (2006) 
observes that the acknowledgement of perpetuating past acts of violence against a particular 
class of persons is important in addressing individual traumatic experiences as it confronts what 
happened in the past and assists in rebuilding a particular class of people’s self-esteem. On the 
other hand, Stover (2004) notes with concern that confronting past atrocities which resulted in 
humiliation, shame and guilt is usually challenging and may lead to the stigmatization of a 
specific group of people which can be viewed as counterproductive in the reconciliation 
process. 
Molenaar (2005) notes that in as much as truth telling is the cornerstone of the process of 
reconciliation, other factors like mercy, justice and peace are essential to the success of any 
reconciliation process. Mercy envisions the need for accepting what happened thereby opening 
up the possibility of starting again on a clean slate. Justice in this sense searches for the rights 
of individuals and groups in order to rebuild and compensate them for what they went through 
during violent conflict. Peace is considered as a need for human security, interdependence and 
well-being (Molenaar, 2005).  
Although these factors may seem independent, they should not be considered in isolation 
because successful reconciliation depends on the interdependence of these factors and if one 
of these is neglected there is a reality of undermining the whole process. For example, Molenaar 
(2005) states that truth without justice will not be accepted by victims who suffered vast human 
rights violations if the perpetrators of such violations are not brought to book for their actions 
or for their part in those violent acts. Justice achieved without truth is dangerous as it may 
create historical amnesia which may lead to a reoccurrence of previous hostilities in the future 
thereby threatening the possibility of sustainable peace which the process of reconciliation 
should aim for (Molenaar, 2005). Mercy is also ineffective if it is not combined with other 
factors like truth and justice. It must not be used as a means to protect perpetrators from taking 
responsibility for their previous violent acts. If there is no peace, it is virtually impossible to 
establish peaceful relationships or a harmonious society.  
27 
 
Concerning justice within the reconciliation process, Minow (1998) states that it is important 
that the kind of justice sought should be restorative rather than retributive. Minow (1998) 
observes that retributive justice focuses on the crime which is seen as against the law and 
punishment for such is imposed by a criminal justice system and not by individuals who want 
to satisfy their desire for revenge for the acts perpetrated against them. On the other hand, Zehr 
(2001) explains restorative justice as the kind of justice which views the crime as a conflict 
between individuals and the consequences of that conflict affects all the parties concerned, 
which include the victim, the perpetrator and the society. In a reconciliation process the justice 
system will be established to reconcile as well as to heal relationships broken by the conflict 
so that a harmonious society may come into existence.  
 
2.6.4- THE ACTORS INVOLVED IN A RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
 
Assefa (2001) points out that attempts at building lasting peace by post-conflict societies has 
to start from its roots meaning that reconciliation has to be mindful of a specific society’s 
cultural heritage as well as its traditions. A perfect example of this is the use of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa of the notion of Ubuntu. Tutu (1999) states that 
the notion of Ubuntu stipulates that at the core of humanity is interdependence, loosely 
translated to mean that a person is a person because of other people. This also means that if one 
individual behaves badly such behaviour is attributable to everyone and by the same token, if 
an individual portrays exemplary behaviour that too is attributed to everyone. In South Africa, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission sought to restore Ubuntu to both the victims and 
perpetrators in order to achieve national reconciliation (Tutu, 1999). 
Brouneus (2007) observes that reconciliation can be instituted from three levels namely top-
level, middle-range and grassroots; each of these levels have their own actors. The top-level 
tier consists of international and national criminal tribunals. This level is important for two 
reasons. The first reason is that for reconciliation to be achieved, perpetrators of atrocities 
during conflict must take responsibility for their actions or their input in those atrocities and in 
case of crimes like genocide, be punished for them (Brouneus, 2007). Brouneus (2007) 
observes the second reason is that for reconciliation to be realized, there should exist an 
effective legal system which is able to maintain order after a society is emerging from conflict. 
It is important at national level for top-level actors to receive the requisite training needed to 
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confront issues around suffering and co-existence after conflict as their decisions have a 
bearing on its citizen’s rehabilitation in a bid to achieve reconciliation (Brouneus, 2007).   
Hayner (2001) states that middle-range tier mechanisms aim to sway the emotions, attitudes 
and behaviour of the top-level and grassroots towards reconciliation. Actors in this level 
include civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, the media and religious groups. 
Brouneus (2007) notes the importance of the media in this level as it can be instrumental in 
promoting peace instead of instigating violence. Hayner (2001) also stresses the importance of 
truth commissions in this level in that they usually influence the top-level as well as involve 
the participation of the whole population in order to achieve reconciliation.   
Brouneus (2003) notes that the grassroots tier is the level with the most number of people as 
the actors are the general population of the country. However, as no single programme can 
successfully incorporate the whole population, grassroots mechanisms include involving 
community leaders who would in turn spread peace awareness and reconciliation projects in 
their communities.  Community leaders who are part of the grassroots tier should not be too 
confrontational or aggressive in addressing past atrocities but have to foster a process of 
tolerance and understanding for past acts so that their communities do not revert back to 
conflict but help in laying the foundation for national reconciliation (Brouneus, 2003).  
 
2.6.5- AID WORKERS IN RECONCILIATION  
 
Brouneus (2003) points out that it is crucial for aid workers who run reconciliation projects at 
a grassroots to have a thorough understanding of the conflict and the effect that it has on the 
people as well as the goals that the process of reconciliations seeks to achieve. This is because 
such aid workers interact with the general population and it is important that in engaging with 
these people, aid workers understand the challenges that conflict and post-conflict impose on 
the people so that the process of reconciliation is also characterized by empathy. Brouene 
(2003) points out that if such a quality is lacking in aid workers who are working at a grassroots 
level, then the whole purpose of achieving reconciliation may be defeated when the population 
senses disrespect for what they went through during the conflict. Such feelings may in turn 
result in a renewed desire for revenge against former enemies putting a halt to the attempts to 
establish harmonious relationships. Although aid workers are usually from international 
organizations and may not have had first-hand experience of the effects of the conflict, it is 
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their duty to understand the effects of the conflict so that they can better assist the grassroots 
in the process of reconciliation.  
 
2.6.6- TRUTH COMMISSIONS  
 
It is at the grassroots level that we observe the importance of truth commissions because the 
success of these is based on the participation of the general population which include the 
victims, perpetrators and the community at large (Brouneus, 2007). The reach of truth 
commissions also stretches beyond those who were directly affected during the conflict to those 
who were in other cities and to those who were not yet born at the time of the conflict through 
the use of the media or programmes which enable the establishment of village tribunals as in 
the case of Rwanda (Brouneus, 2007). As seen in the case of South Africa, truth commissions 
also have an invaluable contribution in informing national policy in ensuring that the injustices 
of the past are adequately addressed.  
Kumar (1999) states the various initiatives which have been used at various tiers to ensure 
reconciliation in a number of countries. For example, peace committees which included 
citizens, leaders of ethnic groups, political parties, academic and religious institutions were 
established in the cities of India in 1947 in order to stop the ethnic clashes which had the 
country on its knees (Kumar, 1999). Such committees have also been responsible to fostering 
mutual understanding and paving a way for restoration in places like South Africa and 
Nicaragua. Reconciliation Commissions have also been established in countries like Bulgaria 
and Poland where grassroots have contributed significantly to the process of reconciliation. 
 
2.6.7- TYPES OF GRASSROOTS RECONCILIATION 
 
For the past few years, there has been a revision of thinking on the complex dynamics and 
processes of post-conflict peace building which has included the idea that effective and 
sustainable peacemaking processes must be based not merely on the manipulation of 
agreements made by the elite but more so the empowerment of the communities torn apart by 
conflicts.  This means that a good peace building shifted from top-down, but was now also 
bottom-up. This is because of three elements that have so far been seen as important. First, that 
there are some embedded cultures and economies of violence that makes it hard for 
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constructive interventions (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005). Secondly, the 
specification of the significance of post-conflict peace building and formal agreements needs 
understanding, structures and long-term development frameworks on the ground. Lastly, there 
is a need for the local actors with their knowledge and wisdom. This therefore would help to 
put in place or enhance sustainable citizen-based peacebuilding initiatives.  
What must be noted is that bottom-up peacebuilding cannot be seen in isolation of 
cosmopolitan conflict resolution, acting to confront the global and higher level forces that 
impact on local communities (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005). 
 
2.7-  PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW (BOTTOM-UP)  
 
After different attempts to bring peace in conflict areas like Yugoslavia in the 1990s became a 
challenge to peacemakers, approaches to peace building were developed. The anti-hegemonic, 
counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic peace building projects as well as counter-life world 
constructs were put in place. Seeming not to respond to what was desired, an idea or a thinking 
that peacebuilding need to “… move away from an outsider neutral approach towards a 
partnership with the local actors. This element of involving the local actor is what brought 
about the peacebuilding from below.” (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:217)  
Lederach (1995) is a leading scholar on the issue of peacebuilding from below. Grassroots 
peace building then offers a way of bottom up peace building that changes the nature of 
violence and possible violent outbreak. Peace from below does not allow readymade solutions. 
It is clear in the bottom-up framework that any solution that the people could have received 
due to their experience of war and suffering and give true solution was that which could come 
deep from their heart. And any other would just be important enough but not relevant to 
promote peace. Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, (2005:218) agree that “… through local 
peacemakers who had received advices, consultative-facilitative roles through workshops and 
training in areas necessary according to their own circumstances and needs” peace has the 
highest possibility of being sustainable. Peace from below empowers the local community who 
knew what the conflict has been like and help able to rebuild democratic institutions and 
develop local peacemakers. Therefore, all players from outside including the UN and 
Peacekeepers are only to take part in empowerment. Empowered grassroots can deal with 
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questions of “how to control violence and how to relate the control of violence and building 
relationships at the community level.” (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:218)    
Furthermore “… peacebuilding from below [is] linked to the idea of liberating communities 
from the oppression and misery of violence in a project whose main goal was the cultivation 
of cultures and structures of peace”  (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall,  2005:220), and 
for effectiveness and success, of grassroots peacebuilding it is important to identify “… cultural 
modalities and resources within the setting of conflict in order to evolve a comprehensive 
framework which takes into consideration both short and long term perspectives for conflict 
resolution”   (Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:220). 
 
2.7.1- IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW   
 
While Angola ignores the role of the grassroots for peace builders and promoters of justice, 
Lederach (1995; 1997) and Ramsbhotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) see grassroots 
peacebuilding as a way of avoiding problems and promoting stability is a given society. In 
chapter 6 this research dedicates more attention to the issue of peacebuilding from below as a 
way out for sustainable peace process in Angola. This is not to stop the outsiders’ intervention, 
but just calling them to reorient their roles.  
The above idea is therefore taken as a good model for a sustainable peacebuilding in post-
conflict society which must be rooted at the grassroots or communal level. Another trend 
supporting peacebuilding from below is the liberal peace project. A summary of this approach 
is presented below in order to elucidate the efficacy of bottom-up peace building.  
 
2.7.2- LIBERAL PEACE FROM BELOW 
 
For a long time efforts have beenmade to respond to need for peace, especially by those who 
may be called come from outside the conflict zone and many times or always they are state 
actors. But a new approach has taken root as well where non-state actors and the civil society 
from within these war or conflict zones participate and work towards a sustainable peace. So 
these actors work not just to bring civil peace but also contribute to the construction of 




2.7.3- HUMAN SECURITY AS A FOUNDATION FOR PEACE 
 
With the need to redefine what security is from state to individual, a new concept emerges 
called Human security. It was based on the concepts or framework associated with civil society, 
the non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This has become notable for it has been taken by 
key policy circles like UN organizations and donor states like Japan (Richmond, 2005). This 
means that now “… instead of focusing on the inter-state relations to foster peace building, 
social, political and economic reforms are introduced which in turn affects the people directly” 
(Richmond, 2005: 128). This new approach was seen to be an effective way because these non-
governmental actors were seen to have unparalleled access to conflict zones far beyond the 
official actors like the political actors. 
This new approach, human security as a concept, then broadened the agents and structures from 
something that had been seen before as a source of insecurity itself. At the same time “… it has 
recognized the complexity of security issues, and the breath of issues and actors who are 
affected by them” (Richmond, 2005:129). Liberal peace from below “offers a vision of peace 
in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and 
institutional projects for peace” (Richmond, 2005:129). 
Based on the number of non-state actors that we have today working in the area of 
peacebuilding, we can say without any doubt that this bottom-up approach to attaining peace 
is  a very important way and means in attaining sustainable peace with human security as a 
means in achieving this goal. Social justice, development and democratization of institutions 
have been elements which this process and the actors can boast of as having been achieved. 
Thus those non-state actors must continue to remain focused on civil peace otherwise they may 
confuse their role and also find themselves promoting their personal interests rather than those 
whose suffering they are to serve. In the event that they are not able to secure and conduct their 
work of liberal peace effectively, they could secure the help of outside actors who could use 
force to produce liberal order. 
On the other hand, Babo-Soares (2004) observes that there are two categories of grassroots 
reconciliation and the first one is family reconciliation which involves personal contact with 
the general population. In East and West Timor, this form of reconciliation was done through 
welcoming ceremonies and arranged meetings to welcome exiled and internally displaced 
people back into their communities (Babo-Soaes, 2004). This category also makes provision 
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for family reunions, ceremonies conducted to traditionally welcome exiles by community 
leaders in a bid to foster reintegration into the communities. Babo-Soares (2004) observes that 
during such ceremonies in Timor, such celebrations would reserve time for an address by a 
public figure who will acknowledge the atrocities committed during the conflict, offer 
apologies and accept consequences of their actions.  
The second category is people’s reconciliation which is like family reconciliation but involves 
the whole community. In this category, parties to the conflict arrange to have refugees returned 
to their places of origin and the ceremonies are conducted in the presence of all the political 
authorities who were party to the conflict. These ceremonies usually end with the parties 
involved making commitments to preserve peace and foster the process of reconciliation within 
their communities.  
 
2.8- RECONCILIATION AND FORGIVENESS 
 
Monteville (2002) observes that the objective of reconciliation especially in post-conflict 
reconstruction processes is usually vaguely defined but in most cases it is the acknowledgement 
of wrong-doing from the perpetrators and the forgiveness on the part of the victims. McGonegal 
(2009) notes that in recent years, whenever there are attempts at reconciling societies torn apart 
by conflict, forgiveness is an important topic for the social, cultural and political theorists. 
Hamber (2007) suggests that in this day and age in which we live where conflict and political 
turmoil is the order of the day, the connection between reconciliation and forgiveness has 
become paramount to establishing sustainable peace in a state.   
Mellor, Bretherton and Firth (2007) point out that forgiveness and reconciliation have to be 
analyzed considering their political context. This means that the circumstances in which the 
conflict arose will be considered within the process of reconciliation as well as the possibility 
of forgiveness in a post-conflict situation. The concept of reconciliation can also never be 
referred to as an absolute but it invites a wide variety of questions such as what needs to be 
reconciled and the reasons for the reconciliation (Mellor Bretherton and Firth, 2007). 
Therefore, Lerche (2000) concludes that reconciliation and forgiveness cannot be made 
uniform for all circumstances as though in a particular context they can have universal 
application.   
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Derrida (2001) points out that the emphasis on forgiveness in the process of achieving 
reconciliation has the possibility of tainting forgiveness. This is because reconciliation and 
forgiveness are different processes and hence using the language of forgiveness in the process 
of reconciliation hinders parties from achieving true and pure forgiveness. This is because, as 
already mentioned, the process of reconciliation involves more than two parties whereas the 
presence of a third party risks the possibility of not achieving pure forgiveness (Derrida, 2001).   
However, Cary (1998) observes that forgiveness is a catalyst to achieving reconciliation 
because it essentially combines notions of civil relationship and those of empathy. In his 
argument, he describes the process of forgiveness in the German-American post-war and the 
Vietnam-American relations and emphasizes that the process involved truth telling, 
apologizing and healing. Cary (1998) also points out that whenever people are speaking about 
the political theory of forgiveness, there is a high possibility of combining forgiveness with 
politics or to label the act of forgiving as a political one but a deep consideration of what 
forgiveness is, shows that it is a personal and internal change of heart or perspective and it will 
have a bearing on the political realm. This is the clear distinction between forgiveness and 
politics which is a longshot from grand gestures in public by political figures which will be 
aimed at portraying acts of forgiveness.    
To support the view of how separate reconciliation and forgiveness is, Huyse (2003) suggests 
that the process of reconciliation does not require forgiveness as a prerequisite. However, in 
the political arena, there is usually the tendency to force forgiveness through what has been 
termed false reconciliation where the involved parties feel obliged to forgive the perpetrator or 
that they need to publicly show that they have reconciled with the perpetrator. Ignatieff (1996) 
observes that this occurs when the perpetrator forces the notions of putting the past behind 
them or forgiving and forgetting on the victim. Hamber (2007) observe that this was one of the 
major shortcomings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. 
In conclusion, the process of reconciliation is necessary in countries emerging from conflict in 
order to foster sustainable peace. There are three tiers involved in the reconciliation process 
and these are top-level, middle-range and grassroots. The grassroots are instrumental in 
fostering harmonious relationships between previously conflicting parties and also inform 




2.8.1- MEDIATION  
 
The period from the 90s until the early 2000s was evidenced by the United Nations involvement 
in the peaceful settlement of disputes (Hampson, 2003). Hampson (2003) notes that not only 
did the UN have a large number of peacekeepers in war torn areas than before, but its 
involvement was instrumental in the negotiation and implementation of settlements which as a 
result, ended some of the bloodiest and longest civil wars. Mason (2007) observes that of the 
international and civil crises that occurred from 1918 to 2001, 128 of these were resolved 
through some form of mediation. The level of such mediation is also observed to have moved 
from the development of a straight forward agreement to end a conflict to the development of 
an agreement that has a vision beyond the conflict which is a more complex process (Mason, 
2007). 
This section will unpack what mediation and facilitation is and the rationale of using mediation 
and facilitation as intervention strategies to end conflicts. It will then consider the role of the 
UN as a mediator in the Angolan conflict to assess whether or not its involvement was crucial 
to putting an end to the 27 year long civil conflict.  
 
2.8.2-  MEDIATION AND FACILITATION 
 
Mirimanova (2009) notes that mediation and facilitation are types of conflict intervention 
which aim to resolve conflicts through monitoring the communication between conflicting 
parties. The process of mediation is characterized by the presence of a third party who leads 
the communication between the representatives of the parties in conflict in order for these 
representatives to meet and talk to each other, discuss pertinent issues, make compromises and 
reach an agreement to end the conflict.  
Official mediation is when those who hold top rank positions and those in decision making 
positions or their representatives meet. Mirimanova (2009) notes that the parties in an official 
mediation range from members from the government or state representatives to members of 
active parties in the conflict such as armed rebels to those who do not recognize the law or the 
government in power. Hence, parties in an official mediation are the official leaders of the 
groups that they represent. On the other hand, participants in an unofficial mediation vary from 
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civil society representatives, students, journalists and concerned members of the general public 
(Mirimanova, 2009).  
Mirimanova (2009) observes that when parties are party to a mediation, they are bound to reach 
an agreement that is mutually acceptable to all the parties concerned. The process of mediation 
also enables the parties concerned to examine other possible avenues to resolving their conflict 
over and beyond what international and national law prescribes for political, economic and 
social agreements to end conflicts (Mirimanova, 2009). This is the advantage that mediation 
has over arbitration or the imposition of a solution by force. Measures are set during mediation 
to guard against the possibility of parties being in violation of the terms of the agreement and 
an example of such measures are the imposition of sanctions. Mirimanova (2009) notes that 
the imposition of sanctions is not the only measure that ensures that parties adhere to the terms 
in the agreement but the dedication by top officials to the realization of peace as well as the 
advantages that will come their way if the agreement is observed also is a factor to ensuring 
that the parties to a mediation process do not violate the agreement. 
 
2.8.3- THE RATIONALE BEHIND MEDIATION AND FACILITATION 
 
The main reason behind the process of mediation is that parties come up with their positions 
based on what they think the other parties’ position is (Mason, 2007). However, such notions 
tend to change and shift according to what the parties gather when they are at the mediation 
table. This is because they begin to realize that what they thought was the position of the 
conflicting party is actually not and the more they listen the better they get to understand the 
actions or strategies that have been taken by that particular party. However, as already 
mentioned, the process of mediation works better with the presence of a third party facilitating 
the communication between the parties (Mason, 2007).   
Mason (2007) notes that if the state in conflict is not willing to settle the conflict peacefully or 
if the conflict is the cause of international disagreements then then the process by which the 
conflict is resolved has to be informal and dependent on whether or not the independent or 
sovereign parties engaged in the conflict.  Hence, the process of mediation has to be mandated 
by the parties in conflict.   
Compared to other forms of resolving conflict like through military interventions, mediation is 
less expensive (Mason, 2007). However, mediation has to be used along other conflict 
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intervention tools like military peace support operations as such tools become necessary to 
implement the terms of the agreement. Mason (2007) also observes that since the success of 
mediation lies in whether or not the conflicting parties accept the third party and its power to 
facilitate the process, it is a tool that is more effective for small countries. This is because in as 
much as such countries do not have the capacity to compete internationally for power but they 
have the capacity to influence some decisions made internationally.  
 
2.9- UN AS A MEDIATOR AND FACILITATOR 
 
Hampson (2003) considers pertinent questions about the role of the UN in mediation processes 
and whether or not such interventions have been successful. Such questions include what 
mediation resources brings with it into the process and what lessons can be learnt from previous 
mediation interventions which were facilitated by the UN. Hampson (2003), in an attempt to 
provide answers to the questions asked, notes that in its role as a facilitator in a mediation 
process, the UN: 
i. Lacks real power 
ii. Is not flexible or vigorous enough to follow an effective negotiation plan 
iii. Is the last resort to resolving conflict and as a result has to confront immensely 
challenging differences and 
iv. Lacks sufficient legitimacy which in turn affects its ability and capacity to play the role 
of mediator. 
Zartman (2001) notes that regardless of who the mediator is, the conflicting parties have to be 
ready to consider the outcome of the negotiation as the way to resolve the conflict. In other 
words, the conflict should have reached a boiling point such that it would be the opportune 
moment for mediation to happen as a means to ending the conflict. Therefore, Zartman (2001) 
suggests that the precondition for mediation to happen and to have any chance of success 
should be either that both the sides have come to a realization that continuing with conflict will 
be more burdensome than sitting down at the negotiating table for mediation. Negotiation 
through mediation has to be the only logical manner in which the parties observe as a means to 
end the conflict.  
Boutros-Ghali (1996) notes that for the UN to even consider the role of a mediator between 
conflicting parties, it has to be given a clear mandate and support by the Security Council. 
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However, if the members of the Security Council are divided on whether or not the UN should 
act as a mediator between conflicting parties because members of the Security Council have 
their own agendas or they stand to benefit more if the conflict continues compared to when 
parties end the conflict, then it will be a challenge for the parties an those following the 
negotiations to gain trust in the intentions of the UN or the level of power that it has to see the 
mediation process through (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). 
Hampson (2003) notes that in as much as the UN may seem to have little power as a mediator, 
it is a mistake to view it as neutral and impartial. This is because in some instances where it 
seems as if the most effective way to get parties to comply with an agreement reached after 
mediation is cohesive intervention, the UN is capable of unleashing the power of the Security 
Council on the parties, as was seen in the cases of Mozambique and Tajikistan (Hampson, 
2003). However, for this to happen there has to be agreement between the mediator, the 
Secretary General and the Security Council and it has to be unanimous on the part of the 
Security Council to send a force to the area in conflict or to carry out threats.     
Most importantly, the success of the UN in any mediation process is dependent on the 
coordination of the Security Council members and they have to set a clear political strategy, be 
prepared to provide support and the resources so that the process is legitimate and not 
undermined (Hampson, 2003). 
The UN has been instrumental in the mediation between conflicting parties and the success or 
failure of such mediation has been largely attributable to certain facts. Such include that the 
Security Council plays a huge part in giving the UN the mandate to act as a mediator and that 
the parties in conflict have to be at a point where continued conflict is more disadvantageous 
compared to meeting with a mediator and resolving the conflict through mediation. 
Taken together, the literature on conflict transformation suggests that to deal with a conflict 
there is a need to address both the “episode and the epicentre of conflict” (Lederach, 2003:31).  
Presenting the full picture of a conflict is a challenge that needs patience. As Lederach 
(2003:39) puts it, the challenge consists of “… how to end something not desired and build 
something that is desired […] It requires capacity to see through and beyond the presenting 
issues to the deeper pattern, while seeking creative responses that address real-life issues in 
real time”.   
If the process of peace building is successful through the various mechanisms outlined above, 
there are stages that take place for peace to be sustainable. Many countries that have reached 
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agreements, face challenges of climbing the ladder of transformation. Very often there is a 
stalemate at the level of negative peace, the achieved peace takes time to become positive 
peace. It is happening today in Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, and Angola. The literature on peace 
distinguishes clearly the difference between positive and negative peace. A brief description of 
the concepts is presented below.  
 
2.10- NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE PEACE 
 
Sharp (2012) defines physical violence as murder, rape, torture and other civil and political 
violations. On the other hand, economic violence refers to economic and social rights 
violations, corruption and the senseless pillaging of natural resources (Sharp, 2012). Although 
physical violence is often direct, economic violence is usually indirect but the definition of 
these forms of violence is not entirely accurate because not every civil or political violation 
will be characterized by the use of force or violence and some economic and social rights 
violations, for example hunger, are a form of physical abuse (Sharp, 2012).   
Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) state that the use of the term positive peace often 
refers to the transformation that takes place in order to address past or previous inequalities. 
Positive peace occurs when the political party in charge of the government includes the other 
parties and gives a voice to the minorities who were previously marginalized. When it comes 
to the economic structures of a country that has been in armed conflict, transformation occurs 
when those who were previously exploited or disadvantaged gain access to the country’s 
resources on a sufficient level to satisfy their basic necessities. Christie, Tint, Wagner and 
Winter (2008) also observe that while negative peace usually relies on the dominance of the 
state, positive peace does not depend on the dominance of the state and can take place at any 
point when social and economic injustices are present.   
Sharp (2012) states that negative peace does not only involve the absence of violence or conflict 
but the absence of all other forms of violence such as poverty, corruption and all forms of social 
and economic inequalities. While positive peace seeks to achieve many goals of provisional 
justice, it should also seek the attainment of the rule of law and establishing democracy (Sharp, 
2012). This is because countries that are established democracies and boast of the efficiency of 
their rule of law still have high levels of poverty and other forms of violence (Sharp, 2012).  
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Galtung (1985) notes that in a country emerging from conflict, the focus should not only be on 
negative peace but also on positive peace in the sense that efforts to reduce violent episodes 
should be done at the same time as redressing the social, economic and ecological injustices 
suffered in the past. Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) also agree with Galtung (1985) 
and state that for peace to be real and lasting, it has to ensure that all forms of physical violence 
are eliminated and that an impartial social order is created so that the needs and rights of all 
citizens are met.  
Christie, Tint, Wagner and Winter (2008) observe that in most instances conflict within 
countries occurs due to competition for scarce resources. Even when the conflict is over, 
challenging life conditions like economic deprivation, which is what Angola is facing 
currently, can frustrate people to the degree of disturbing the existing peace. They note that in 
extreme cases, absolute deprivation can lead to mass murders and genocide and history has 
shown this to be true, for example in the case of Rwanda. 
In summary, this chapter has dealt with various lenses of conflict transformation. It looked at 
the concept of generational change for peace. What comes across is that peace building requires 
concrete and complete structural engagement. By concrete is meant a clear strategy that goes 
to the core problems, effects, and proses a desired change. By complete is meant the 
participation of all intervenient in a society.  
What is clear is that ceasefire is a good beginning towards peace building, but honest and true 
dialogue is necessary to deepen any peace process. For the dialogue to happen, mediators like 
the UN are very important. At times the UN seems weak, but through the backing of Security 
Council they can be at a longer run drivers of change and bring about true reconciliation.  
Chapter 3 now looks at the Angolan peace process. The causes of the conflict are brought 






CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION IN ANGOLA  
 
This chapter explores at the main changes Angola has gone through until the 2002 cease fire 
in Luanda. First it presents the reasons for the breaking up of the war. Then it looks at the 
factors that led the failure of the Angolan peace attempts  
 
3.1- THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN ANGOLA 
 
The history of Angola is one which prominently features colonialism and a protracted period 
of conflict. The presence of the Portuguese and its interaction with the locals was the 
relationship of the colonial master and the oppressed, whilst the country became the trade link 
with Asian countries as well as a place for the development of the slave trade (Bercovitch and 
Simpson, 2010). The 1960s were the height of anti-colonial sentiment across Africa. Africans 
gained consciousness of a sovereign people and starting fighting for independence. Angola 
joined the wave of freedom. However, Knudsen and Zartman (1995) observe that a poorly 
thought through independence agreement and a weak Marxist-Leninist regime resulted in a 
bloody and prolonged civil war. One of the most pressing issues among the nationalist groups 
was how a satisfactory agreement on power-sharing was going to be produced (Malaquais, 
2001). In 1975 a civil war broke out and despite attempts by the international community to 
broker peace through the use of peace agreements, the war continued until the death of Jonas 
Savimbi in 2002 (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). 
 
3.1.1-  NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT 
 
As has been alluded to already, the Angolan civil war broke out in 1975; this was immediately 
after the struggle for independence from Portuguese colonialism.  
From the period of the struggle for independence three main nationalist groups were formed:  
The Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA), the Movimento Papular para a 
Libertação de Angola (MPLA), and the União Nacional para Independência de Angola 
(UNITA) (UN, 2012). However, after the struggle for independence was won the FNLA did 
not play much of a role in the events that led to the outbreak of the civil war. The civil war 
ensued after the struggle for independence mainly because of the ideological differences 
between the MPLA and the UNITA (Birmingham, 1992). These movements claimed 
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legitimacy and autonomy, however, as put by Ruigrok (2011:76) “… the question of 
identifying the first genuine political force that emerged in Angola and its consequent 
legitimacy and credibility before the Angolan people and the world, are discordant issues that 
have remained until today”.  
The challenge of pin pointing the legitimate movement, has caused some confusion in the 
country. It seems like, the past has one history and two memories. As put by Ruigrok (2011:78) 
“… the basic concern of each movement was not just to end Portuguese colonialism and to 
liberate Angolan people, but also to take control of the state and to eliminate rival forces”. 
Furthermore, the military variable in the Angolan conflict played a paramount role in the 
conflict. The three parties involved in the fight after independence had armies. For decades, 
these armies fought to defend the party’s colours. It is with this sentiment that civil war broke 
out for approximately 27 years and led to the loss of over 1.5 million lives whilst over 4 million 
people were internally displaced. (Brinkman, 2003). 
The MPLA was formed in 1956 with the primary objective to be the leaders of the struggle for 
independence from Portuguese colonialism (Malaquias, 2000). The weakness of this nationalist 
group was that its influence did not reach the people who lived in the South. The group’s area 
of influence was predominantly in the Northern area because that was where most of its 
leadership was centralized. The major strength of the MPLA was that its support based included 
a significant number of Angolans who had obtained higher degrees of education and who had 
embraced the Portuguese way of life, known as assimilados. Its support base also included 
mixed Angolans as well as members of the settlers. (Malaquias, 2000). 
Malaquias (2000) observes that the FNLA was formed with the objective of the restoration of 
the ancient Kongo kingdom in the northern part of Angola. The FNLA was therefore largely 
composed of several ethnic groups which had the same vision for northern Angola. The main 
area of influence of the FNLA was almost exclusively the Bacongo ethnic group and various 
attempts to expand on its area of influence failed (Malaquias, 2000).  
Like the reasons behind the formation of the FNLA, UNITA was also formed purely for ethnic 
reasons. UNITA represented the Ovimbundu people who are the major ethnic group in Angola 
in terms of numbers. With their strength in numbers, the Ovimbundu believed that they should 
also have their own liberation movement in order to counterbalance the power that the 
movements which represented the other bigger ethnic groups had (Malaquias, 2000). Literature 
has shown that the reasons behind the formation of the nationalist movements in Angola was 
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never national but rather sub-national. Malaquias (2000) is of the point of view that these 
movements were concerned with furthering the aspirations of particular ethnic groups and not 
the realization of a multi-ethnic and an all racial inclusive Angola.  
 
3.2- THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR 
 
Khadiagala (2005) notes that the end of Marcello Caetano’s dictatorship in 1974 facilitated the 
rate at which Portuguese colonies were decolonized but this was not without challenges as there 
were no decolonization plans in the pipeline and there were major divisions in the government. 
The main reason behind this state of affairs was that before the military coup which ended the 
dictatorship, the regime’s strategy was to defeat the liberation movements as opposed to 
negotiating with them. There were issues around power sharing beyond the colonial war and 
as soon as factional divisions set into the government, Lisbon lost its grip on the Angolan 
political process (Khadiagala, 2005). This resulted in four provisional governments in one year 
which increased the influence of discontenting factions and this had an effect on the 
decolonisation process. Khadiagala (2005) also observes that the chaos during the transition 
period was largely due to the lack of long-term preparation for independence and so the colonial 
regime was improvising as it engaged with the nationalist movements.   
Ekaney (1977) highlights that in 1974 General Spinola in Portugal appointed Vice-Admiral 
Rosa Coutinho to head the military in Angola. One of the major tasks that he had to perform 
was to navigate the Angolan transition in the face of a deteriorating economy, racism, violence 
as well as divisions within the nationalist movements. General Spinola had a framework for 
the decolonization of Angola which included that the three major liberation movements in 
Angola be recognized, and the setting up of a two-year provisional government including the 
three liberation movements and the settler community and the preparation by the government 
to conduct elections for the Constituent Assembly, under the monitoring of the United Nations, 
which would be tasked with drafting a Constitution for Angola (Ekaney, 1977).  
This plan was met with resistance by the nationalist movements. Their main argument was that 
if the settler community was included in the government it would be an outright rejection of 
the objectives of attaining independence. This resistance caused a commotion within the 
government and the country (Africa Research Bulletin, 1974). The chances for the formation 
of the interim government vanished when the settler community attempted a coup and General 
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Spinola was ousted in September 1974. The FNLA increased its military attacks in the northern 
parts of Angola, as put by Ruigrog (2011: 77)  
 “In January 1961, falling cotton prices and the failure to pay the peasant growers 
led to strike, which was by beatings and arrests. This triggered a revolt against 
the Portuguese authorities and their system of enforced cotton growing in 
Kassanje area. A group of disgruntled cotton workers attacked government 
buildings and a Catholic mission. The violence spread to the northwest, where 
over the course of days Bakongo in Uíge province attacked isolated farmsteads 
and towns killing hundreds of Portuguese”.  
The combined effects of these instances were decisive in putting an end to any prospects of an 
all-inclusive multiracial government (Khadiagala, 2005).  
In October 1974, UNITA’s Savimbi sought to unite all the nationalist movements and his 
party’s congress endorsed a UNITA-MPLA-FNLA united front. The congress also gave 
Savimbi the leeway to gather support for the united front from other African countries 
(Bridgland, 1986). However, this was almost brought to naught by the violence which resumed 
almost immediately in Luanda between the supporters of MPLA and FNLA. According to 
Malaquias (2009:320) “Civil war in post- independent Angola was inevitable. The major 
problems that conspired against the visibility of the Angolan state were glaringly visible at the 
time of independence. The chaotic decolonization process took place amidst complex political 
and military crises arising from the three anti-colonial groups”.  Bridgland (1986) points to the 
fact that another incident of civil disorder erupted during the strike by longshoremen which 
blocked the shipment of goods on the Benguela railroad in Lobito. Maximizing on this chaos 
a group from the settler community attempted a rebellion against the authorities, which was 
quickly subdued resulting in a more united MPLA and FNLA who started to work with the 
authorities to patrol streets and curb incidents of violence (Bridgland, 1986).     
For Spikes (1993) the efforts by other African countries like Zambia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Tanzania and various continental organizations like the African Union played a 
significant role in uniting the three nationalist movements in Angola. After a meeting with 
regional leaders the FNLA and UNITA signed a unity agreement in November 1974. 
Furthermore, following a meeting between Counhi and Savimbi, UNITA and MPLA signed a 
bilateral agreement. The night before the Mombasa summit in 1975, Savimbi was a mediator 
between a meeting with the FNLA and the MPLA. One of the highlights of the agreement was 
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the pledge to bring an end to the violence and propaganda and to create an atmosphere that 
favoured cooperation and mutual respect (Spikes, 1993).   
Gleijeses (2002) observes that peace in Angola was dependent on the willingness of the 
nationalist movements to uphold the agreements that they had made as well as Portugal’s 
willingness to deploy military troops to ensure that the provisions agreed to were honoured. 
The events that unfolded proved that neither of the parties was willing to do what was necessary 
to uphold the agreements (Spikes, 1993). Prior to the agreements, the nationalist movements 
separately boosted their military and financial standing. This led to the provision of arms and 
instructors from China to the FNLA via the Democratic Republic of Congo and in response to 
this the Soviet Union provided arms to the MPLA through Tanzania (Bridgland, 1986).  
With this level of foreign support, both the FNLA and the MPLA wanted to gain control of 
Luanda, and although both movements had great influence especially in the slums, the FNLA 
was militarily superior to the MPLA (Africa Research Bulletin, 1975). Around the same time 
there was a wave of labour strikes which caused a serious economic downturn. The transitional 
government was not able to disarm the thousands of civilians who had arms from the period of 
the struggle for independence. Although there were attempts to disarm the civilians, there was 
a perception that the MPLA was instead reluctant to disarm them in a bid to give them power 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 1975). 
In order to keep pace with the increasing influence of the MPLA in Luanda, the FNLA 
leadership acquired a television station and a leading newspaper (Africa Research Bulletin, 
1975). It also began to facilitate the movement of well-armed soldiers from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo into Angola. In March 1975, there was a clash between the FNLA and the 
MPLA in Luanda as a result of the soldiers brought in by the FNLA from outside Angola. In 
April the FNLA attacked the headquarters of MPLA in Luanda leaving hundreds dead and 
more than a thousand wounded. At the same time there were instances of fighting between 
UNITA and MPLA. Attempts of a ceasefire were fruitless as bloody battles between the MPLA 
and the FNLA were expanding into the northern parts of Angola and the Cabinda enclave 
(Africa Research Bulletin, 1975). 
These battles were heightened by the military intervention of outside powers. For example, 
more than 50 000 Cubans fought on behalf of the MPLA and by the late1980s the MPLA could 
be characterized as being oppressive, intolerant and corrupt, unjustly enriching its members 
and embezzling vast amounts of money through the sale of Angola’s oil resources (London 
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Conciliation Resources, 2004). UNITA reigned terror on larger parts of Angola compared to 
the other movements. The Bicesse Accords which were signed by the MPLA and UNITA to 
stop the war were fruitless as were the UN peacekeeping missions in 1991, 1993,1995 and 
1998 (London Conciliation Resources, 2004).   
Carames (2009) observes that the war resumed in 1998 between the Angolan armed forces and 
UNITA and although the armed forces sought to control the whole country via military means, 
UNITA had control of all rural areas. Conflict ended in 2002 with the death of Savimbi but 
even then there were reported incidents of violence in the Cabinda, Benguela and Huambo.    
3.3-PEACE ACCORDS  
 
Angola has experienced numerous failed attempts of to stop the massive killing that was 
devastating the country. These attempts were the Alvor Accords in 1974, Bicesse Accords in 
1991, Lusaka Protocol in 1994, and Luena Memorandum of Understanding in 2002. Only the 
Luena agreement worked.  
The first step in conflict transformation is immediate action which seeks to stop the killing in 
a violent situation. After a ceasefire is observed there are crucial steps leading to sustainable 
peace.  
The step following ceasefire is negotiation, leading eventually, to the signing of a peace 
agreement. Ledearch (2005:41) asserts that peace accords are at times “a simple act of former 
enemies placing their names side by side on a piece of paper represented the culmination of 
negotiations to supposedly end what were years, if not, decades of violence and war”.  The 
definition presented by Lederach underlines the difficult task of transforming a negative peace 
into a positive peace.   
Very often after a very long period of violent confrontation, when peace is reached via a peace 
agreement, government rushes into reconstruction of physical infrastructure. As strengthen by 
Lederach (2005:41-42)  
“… The difficulties of attaining a durable peace in context of protracted violence 
suggest  we know more about how to end something painful and damaging to 
everyone, but less how to build something desired. When we do build after a war, 
we think first and foremost about our physical infrastructure: buildings, roads, 
bridges, and schools. To fully understand and reweave the social fabric of 
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relationships torn apart by decades and generations of hatred remain significant 
challenges”.  
Most accords fail, because they lack integrated vision. There is a lack of clear steps towards 
sustaining the ceasefire. Scholars acknowledge that in instances of negotiating peace 
agreements it is paramount to note that the period is clouded by risks and insecurities and other 
concerns by the parties concerned. Hartzell (2009) views these concerns to be the fact that the 
opponent might have greater control of the country; or that the opponent might obtain more 
political power, or that the opponent might gain considerable economic power within the 
country. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) observe that as a result of these concerns strategies 
have to be in place to ensure that parties negotiate in good faith and that a lasting peace is 
achieved because of the agreement. One of the most important strategies is the involvement of 
a third party in the negotiation, production and the compliance of the agreement (Bercovitch 
and Simpson, 2010).   
Khadiagala (2005) notes that the negotiations for the decolonization of Angola which resulted 
in the Alvor Accords of 1974 portray a situation of non-cooperation and distrust between the 
colonising power and the nationalist movements. The Alvor Accords were formulated in the 
midst of a chaotic transition between the Portuguese and the nationalist movements. The result 
of this was a transitional constitutional document which failed in restoring peace or creating 
rules for the maintenance of that peace. 
  
3.3.1- THE ALVOR ACCORDS IN 1974 
 
The Alvor Accords had sixty articles and three major sections. The first was the 
acknowledgement of the three nationalist movements as representatives of the Angolan people. 
The second was the legal and the administrative provisions for Angola’s independence in 
November 1975. The third was the establishment of procedures by which independence would 
be decided. Chapter 2 made provision for the role of the Portuguese High Commissioner who 
has to arbitrate differences within the transitional government, but in reality the High 
Commissioner could not be afforded such power in the highest transitional institution 
(Khadiagala, 2005).  
The Alvor Accords stipulated that the army would decide on their rightful regions and created 
a ceasefire by incorporated previous bilateral agreements. The Accords also made provision 
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for the creation of a National Defence Commission in order to oversee the integration of 8000 
soldiers from each movement and 24000 Portuguese soldiers into a mixed armed force (Angola 
Peace Fund, 1988). The lack of trust amongst the nationalist movements caused them to ask 
Portugal to keep troops in the country for three months after independence. (Angola Peace 
Fund, 1988).   
The Alvor Accords received criticism over a document that was drawn up in haste and in the 
midst of a disorderly decolonization process which Lisbon had embarked on in 1974. It is 
believed that the document was drawn up out of convenience and attempted to bring together 
those parties with a long history of mutual distrust, to negotiate in good faith. Khadiagala 
(2005) notes that in recognizing the three major nationalist movements as the representatives 
of the people of Angola, the Accords marginalised other parties which would have provided a 
political equilibrium among the nationalist movements.  
The failure of Alvor led the country into a long-lasting conflict. Many attempts were taken to 
reach lasting peace. This discussion continues with an outline of the many attempts to reach 
peace.  
 
3.3.2- THE BICESSE ACCORDS 
 
The United States of America, Russia, Portugal and the United Nations were part of the 
mediators who sought to broker peace between UNITA and MPLA in May 1991. This resulted 
in the signing of the Bicesse Accords. Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) note that the 
circumstances under which the parties met to negotiate a peace agreement were at an 
appropriate time as both sides were experiencing food shortages; this was one of the reasons 
they agreed to a ceasefire along the routes that was used to transport food. In addition, both 
sides had suffered heavy military losses and were reluctant to keep fighting and were willing 
to try and find common ground through the negotiation of a peace agreement. The Bicesse 
Accords were reached a year after negotiations began. The agreement included the formation 
of a multiparty democracy, a ceasefire and the monitoring of elections, the demobilization of 
conflicting parties, and the formation of a national army (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010).     
Messiant (2004) observes that the elections took place in September 1992. The results of the 
elections were a clear victory for MPLA with 54% of the votes and 34% for UNITA. By the 
time that the elections were conducted the credibility of the United Nations was questionable; 
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therefore, their description of the elections as free and fair did not hold much weight. Those 
who voted for the MPLA wanted the results of the elections to be recognized but UNITA was 
clear that it did not recognize these results (Messiant, 2004). Savimbi outright refused to 
acknowledge these results and adamantly refused to give the MPLA the upper hand and as a 
result, Angola went back to war. At this juncture the mediators had failed to ensure respect for 
the results and as such turned a blind eye to the killing of people. The question of whether the 
election results should be ratified or rectified was central to the battle for power between the 
UNITA and MPLA and the mediators could not avoid the resumption of war that resulted 
because of this (Messiant, 2004). 
Using the contingency framework, Bercovitch and Simpson (2010) put forward reasons why 
the Bicesse Accords failed. Lack of clarity cannot be attributed to the failure of the Bicesse 
Accords for the simple reason that the agreement was specific in its stipulations. It clearly 
stated that both parties were prohibited from purchasing lethal weapons, it had clear provisions 
for the reorganisation of the military and police to include combatants from all the conflicting 
parties, and it made provision for elections and how these would be conducted (Bercovitch and 
Simpson, 2010). Although the agreement broke down and the parties went back to war, this 
was not because of any confusion or misinterpretation of the Bicesse Accords as the provisions 
were clear and did not include any vague terms.   
International guarantees were close to non-existent in the case of Angola after the elections. 
This was contrary to the stipulations of the Bicesse Accords which provided for international 
supervision for the implementation of the agreement (Bercovitch and Simpson, 2010). The 
mediators were not too concerned with the ending of the conflict in Angola. This may be seen 
clearly in that, for example, the United Nations deployed 1000 trained peacekeepers from the 
period before the elections in order to keep the peace as compared to the 6000 trained 
peacekeepers deployed in Namibia which had a significantly smaller population than did 
Angola at that time (Messiant, 2004). The settlement failed because the mediators lacked a 
genuine interest in ensuring a sustainable peace from before the elections through to ensuring 
that the parties did not violate the agreement and that they accepted the results of the elections.   
The environment in which the Bicesse Accords were to be implemented was a challenging one. 
The country is a neighbour to the Democratic Republic of Congo which has a similar history 
of being consumed by internal conflict and close African countries like South Africa helped 
mediate the agreement. However, since Angola has one of the largest diamond reserves in 
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Africa, there was a great deal of illegal diamond smuggling to neighbouring countries;  the 
returns were used to further finance the conflict between UNITA and the MPLA (Bercovitch 
and Simpson, 2010). As such, there were some neighbouring countries that had vested interests 
in the conflict in Africa being prolonged to enable them to have access to its mineral wealth 
which could leave the country without much regulation. This also contributed to the failure of 
the Bicesse Accords.  
The signing of the Bicesse Accords did not make provision for equal power sharing and this 
was the main reason for UNITA refusing to acknowledge the results of the elections. The 
Accords did not specify that both parties would provide 20000 soldiers to the national army 
and it did not guarantee positions in the police force for both parties (Bercovitch and Simpson, 
2010). The Lusaka Protocol sought to address the issues around power sharing but despite 
ensuring that both parties would participate in all levels of government and that UNITA would 
be given ministerial portfolios, the Protocol failed and once again the conflicting parties went 
back to war.  
 
3.3.3- THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL 
 
Comerford (2007) notes that the war that resumed after the election results was bloodier than 
what Angola had previously experienced. This came with UNITA’s control of almost 70% of 
the country. These circumstances laid a foundation for the negotiation and the signing of the 
Lusaka Protocol. In October 1993, UNITA sent a communication reaffirming the validity of 
the Bicesse Accords. This made it possible for talks to resume between UNITA and the MPLA; 
this was happening despite the continued fighting and death of citizens (Messiant, 2004). The 
Lusaka Protocol recognized the validity of the election results and therefore viewed UNITA as 
rebels. It put pressure on UNITA to disarm and become part of the government army (Messiant, 
2004). In addition, the sanctions that had been imposed on UNITA by the government in order 
to compel it to negotiate were not lifted. The clause that forbad both sides to rearm themselves 
and other countries from providing such arms was not part of the Protocol. Messiant (2004) 
observes that this left the possibility of other countries providing arms to both the legitimate 
government and the rebels. 
Although this was the case, the Lusaka Protocol saw the arrival of UN peacekeepers, saw 
UNITA members take their place in parliament and the creation of a Government of National 
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Unity and Reconciliation (Comerford, 2007). This did not come easily as UNITA leaders 
constantly refused to travel to Zambia to sign the Protocol and this gave rise to questions about 
the commitment of the party to the validity of the agreement (Comerford, 2007). Comerford 
(2007) notes that although the Lusaka Protocol increased international guarantees with the 
increase of the UN’s mandate and resources, it still had weaknesses which stemmed from the 
Bicesse Accords that still remained unaddressed. From the Bicesse Accords, only the parties 
which were at war were given the exclusive right to negotiate a peace settlement. This therefore 
excluded important key civic contributors such as churches leaders, civil society organisations, 
academics who had a good knowledge and thorough understanding of the key issues leading 
to the conflict and other political parties. Comerford (2007) observes that the contribution of 
these actors would have given the agreement stability as it would not only include the voices 
of the conflicting parties but the voices of all Angolans.   
The implementation of the Protocol was slow and many deadlines were missed largely due to 
UNITA procrastinating in fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. For example, it was 
reluctant to return areas that it held to be administered by the state, it attempted to derail the 
demobilization process by presenting ordinary citizens in place of its soldiers and surrendering 
old weapons that they no longer used (Comerford, 2007). This in turn resulted in the 
determination within the MPLA to end the rebellion of UNITA once and for all which was 
inspired by the support of the United States of America, as it recognized the MPLA as the 
official winners of the elections (Comerford, 2007). Messiant (2004) observes that in addition 
to this, the government did not live up to its obligations regarding the national police and the 
army, and, although the government now included UNITA members, it was exclusively led by 
the MPLA and so, in this instance the notion of power-sharing was a fictitious one.  The final 
straw was the fact that the government, the MPLA, decided to intervene in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and to offer its military support to help put a sympathetic government in 
power; this was an outright violation of the Protocol (Messiant, 2004). At the end of 1998, the 
government, led by the MPLA, embarked on a war against the enemy, UNITA. 
Solomon (2003) points out that a consideration of both the Bicesse Accords and the Lusaka 
Protocol shows that the parties’ inability to implement these peace agreements undermined the 
already volatile relationship of trust that existed between the UNITA and the MPLA. For 
example, during the demobilization process under the Lusaka Protocol, there were instances of 
vast food shortages in areas where UNITA soldiers and their families were resident; this was 
observed to be engineered by the government (Solomon, 2003). This led to these soldiers 
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looting and stealing food from nearby villages and it greatly undermined the peace process. 
The UNITA members in parliament were adamant that the failure by the government to cater 
for the areas where its soldiers and their families resided was a violation of the agreement.  
 
3.3.4- THE LUENA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
The failure of Lusaka protocol led the country to worsening bloodshed.  The violence settled 
when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, was killed by military forces in February of 2002; 
this victory was essential to subduing UNITA’s rebellion (Griffiths, 2004). By March of the 
same year, the government had already reached out to the remaining UNITA leaders to engage 
in talks for a ceasefire. UNITA who had been crippled by the loss of respected leaders and its 
many defeats in the battlefield agreed to a ceasefire. 
The Luena Memorandum of Understanding was specific and technical about the ceasefire and 
it had detailed definitions for the process of demobilization of UNITA’s forces (Griffiths, 
2004). A Joint Military Commission was established and the UN had the role of observing this 
process, a role it shared with countries like the United States of America and Portugal. Griffiths 
(2004) notes that the talks were strictly labelled as military negotiations and so matters relating 
to the position that the remaining UNITA leadership would play in the government or elections 
or the constitution were not discussed but exclusively reserved for further negotiations. It was 
the Luena Memorandum of Understanding that essentially ended the bloodshed that Angola 
had been experiencing for 27 years. 
The different accords that have failed in Angola are an affirmation that post accords are not 
taken as avenue for redefining relationships, rather they are taken as conflict changers 
(Lederach, 2005).  
Furthermore, as quoted by Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:185)  
“Peace agreements provide a framework for ending hostilities and guide to the 
initial stages of post-conflict reform. They do not create conditions under which the 
deep cleavages that produced the war are automatically surmounted. Successfully 
ending the divisions that lead to the war, healing the social wounds created by war, 
and creating a society where the differences among social groups are resolved 
through compromise rather than violent conflict requires that conflict resolution and 
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consensus building shape all interactions among citizens and between citizens and 
the state.”  
The Luena agreement seems to be working, as it has not de-escalated to violent confrontation. 
However, from the point of view of an agreement creating “social and political space where 
negotiation represents an ongoing platform” (Ledearach, 2005:47) nothing is happening. 
Conflict transformation underscores an ongoing and combined effort by the different sectors 
of a given society to transform negative conflict into a desired positive relationship.  
To transform a conflict there are stages to be observed and the different layers of society have 
to be taken into consideration. The issue of different players in Lederach Framework has been 
dealt with in Chapter 2, and will further be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3- ANGOLAS’ NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE PEACE 
 
After discussing the trends of conflict transformation in Chapter 2, it is possible to point out 
the limitation of the Angolan peace process: it is a peace that has stopped in the ceasefire stage. 
As mentioned before, the death of Jonas Savimbi was a euphoric moment for the country, thus 
the year 2002 will always be a memorable year in the minds of Angolan citizens and the world 
over. This is because in April of that year, a historical ceremony took place at the National 
Assembly in Luanda where a memorandum of understanding was signed by opposing military 
leaders to bring to an end the longest lasting civil war in the history of Angola (Porto and 
Clover, 2004). Today in 2016, 14 years since the end of the civil war and since peace was 
brought about, Angola faces more challenges than what was thought would be the case. Porto 
and Clover (2004) note that the major consequence of the severity and the duration of the civil 
war was that it completely destroyed Angola’s economy and infrastructure thereby leaving 
scores of citizens destitute and in utter poverty.  
This section will consider the effects of the civil war on Angola and its citizens. It will also 
differentiate between negative and positive peace in order to consider whether Angola’s peace, 






3.4.1- ANGOLA BEFORE AND AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
 
Porto and Clover (2004) observe that Angola possessed natural resources in the form of fertile 
and agricultural lands, large oil reserves, gas, diamonds, iron ore and gold. However, these 
resources were not spared the impact and effects of the war. Angola was a coffee-producing 
country; it had a promising cotton and sisal export industry in addition to a vibrant mining 
sector all of which were completely destroyed by the war (Porto and Clover, 2004). However, 
the destruction of the Angolan economy and the squandering of the country’s resources cannot 
only be attributed to the war. Poor policy decisions by the parties in power also contributed to 
the demise of the economy.  
During the Angolan civil war, which lasted a record-breaking 27 years, diamonds were a 
prominent feature in the financing of soldiers who fought during the war (Reno, 2000). 
However, Reno (2000) observes that in as much as the exports of diamonds provided large 
sums of money needed for parties like the MPLA and UNITA to continue fighting, such exports 
were not always lawful. In the mid-90s, UNITA was understood to have had in its possession 
up to US$700 million from the sale of diamonds (Reno, 2000). MPLA had areas rich on oil 
under its control and it supplied the government with the petroleum it needed and by the late 
90s MPLA revenues from oil were estimated to be around US$3.3 billion whilst the UNITA 
diamond revenues were just below US$200 million (Reno, 2000). Twenty-seven years of civil 
war was characterized by the illicit export of diamonds the monies which were not used in 
developing the country’s infrastructure or improving the country’s schools; rather it was used 
in accelerating the destruction of the country’s infrastructure and the killing of children and 
young adults who were meant to be in school.   
Porto and Clover (2000) observe that after the war, the road and rail infrastructure were 
completely destroyed and previously accessible fertile land became inaccessible. A road 
network 80000 kilometres completely destroyed making it impossible for people to transport 
their produce and other goods by land. During the war, UNITA forces targeted the railway. 
Therefore, after the war railway system continued to be associated as a target, this impacted on 
the economy of the entire country:  Luanda, Namibe and Lobito ports which relied on 
agricultural produce and products which were manufactured in Angola to fully operate 
collapsed as a result of the country’s inability to manufacture or move goods from one point to 
the other (Porto and Clover, 2004). As a result of this the price of goods and services became 
unaffordable for the ordinary Angolan citizen. The country’s economy never fully recovered 
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from the abuses and misappropriation of the country’s resources made by the parties during the 
war.  
After the peace agreement in 2002 the government rushed into rebuilding infrastructure. Roads 
and railways were rebuilt. With profit from good oil prices Angola enjoyed an economic boom 
due to the rise in international oil prices period from 2008 to 2012.  
Despite this economic boom, the period immediately after the war characterizes the Angolan 
peace process as negative. Peace is not the absence on fighting. It is a myriad countless factors 
to characterize a true peace. After 14 years the country still faces the some challenges, in some 
cases they are even worse off. Although an agreement was signed, the people at grassroots 
level are still suffering deep poverty. Apart from the poverty itself, Angolan peace is negative, 
because it lacks a clear vision for integration. Furthermore today they are reports of physical 
violence due to political differences. 
Before the war, Angola was rich in natural resources that could have developed the country 
beyond what it is today. It was rich in diamonds, oil and gold and had vast fertile, agricultural 
land. However, these resources were abused and used to finance a war that lasted 27 years and 
left the country devastated, with a non-existent economy and poor infrastructure. This chapter 
has observed that in as much as the goal during the war in Angola was to end the violent 
conflict, which is negative peace, there is a need to also achieve positive peace in order to 
address the non-physical violence e.g. the economic violence in order to ensure equality. After 
the war things did not change much. Next an overview of the post-Angolan war is presented.  
 
3.4.2- CHALLENGES IN THE POST-ANGOLA WAR PERIOD 
 
With the end to civil war that was experienced, some positive elements can be counted and this 
is something that all must be grateful for. The large-scale violence and destruction of properties 
and lives can be said to be no more. Another civil war seems not possible according to the way 
people see things. And the country, Angola, is no longer under the colonial master. Having 
given these things our back, the building of communication infrastructure and macro-economic 
has added stability to the country. At the same time, the country is not an island but has friends 
from across the border and across the seas (Oliveira, 2015:205)  
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While the above is true, the country has gone through and continues to go through challenges 
which ought not to be overlooked. Three areas can be pointed out as some of the major 
challenges that have to be checked by especially the ruling elite and the MPLA government.  
 
3.4.3- ILLIBERAL PEACE BUILDING 
 
State building projects with the articulated ideas of the future designed by few yet having 
nothing much to deal with the local people like poverty reduction are letting the country down 
(Oliveira, 2015). But western countries and donors support it because of the hidden interest to 
work with the regime to exploit the resources that is the area of oil, management consultancies 
and global banks. Oliveira (2015) states that all what this does is fosters the empowerment of 
the status quo and has forgotten to contribute to peace, security and prosperity. At the same 
time, increase in revenues due to oil production has led to the strengthening of the state and of 
elite interests with resources empowering the elites which in turn diminished the influence of 
internal and external forces on their actions. 
While there was end to the war and there have been elections which have lead the country to 
the path of democracy, the victory by MPLA afforded it a “rare concentration of political, 
coercive and ideational power” (Oliveira, 2015: 205) 
The status quo has been and continues to be tested and the question of the future after José 
Eduardo dos Santos, who seems to be a hostage to the need for protection of his families and 
allies because of their large stake in the economy which leaves nothing for the new comers and 
the people to appropriate (Oliveira, 2015). Ricardo (2015) continues to assert that there is a 
fear in José Eduardo dos Santos which is not just in the internal politics but also in the prospect 
of foreign legal prosecution which may come up in the event that he retire. So he would stay 
so long as he has not seen a transition that can operate to protect him and the status quo. This 
has been a concern because José Eduardo dos Santos has allowed little by way of autonomous 
decision making or institutionalization. With no clear structure and an institution framework 
devoid of personalities that would be working towards satisfying the status quo, especially José 





3.4.4- LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON TWO INSTITUTIONS, MPLA AND ARMED 
FORCES 
 
Another key concern that Ricardo (2015) sees moves around MPLA and the Armed Forces 
which are two key organizations at play in the country. The MPLA and the armed forces 
deserve particular scrutiny.   The MPLA possesses a challenge in that it has failed to look at 
the country in the broader picture but narrowed its views and dealing to the narrow constituency 
of the elites. And this constituency’s concern is working always for continued cooperation 
rather than disintegration. Because of this, many times disputes are suspended for fear of losing 
their happiness and riches. So many are less or not interested in the common citizens’ concerns 
(Oliveira, 2015)  
On the part of the armed forces, Oliveira (2015) states that less seems to be known to the people 
even though Angolan armed forces still remain among the best and largest in Africa in terms 
of the funding. Though they have been kept at a distance from the political interferences, maybe 
because of immense wealth owned by the leadership around the president, lack of information 
on its operation does not give a glimpse of how the army sees the future. Thus these two 
institutions, MPLA as a party and the armed forces becomes a challenge for the future.  
 
3.4.5- LACK OF DIVERSIFICATION OF THE ECONOMY 
 
With the blessing of oil as a natural resource, the country for a long time has been able to run 
its budget with more than 90% of its budget coming from the oil export. This has come with a 
lot of challenges in that it has exposed the country to external shocks especially with the drop 
in the oil prices at the international level. Nothing from the current regime and maybe in the 
next seems to show that there is a thought out system to look at how to diversify the economy, 
especially within the domestic arena like industries, agriculture and investing in the human or 
population capacities (Ricardo, 2015) At present, what is happening is that the few that are 
being put in place seem to be designed primarily to favour those close to power instead of 
increasing the Angola’s productivity capacity. Without this, the country will continue to face 
the problem of human resources as it does today.  
During war, people become more demoralized, especially when it came to things to do with 
the state, more so when the state was involved in their suffering. To put them together would 
be close to impossible because they had given up. This was the feeling after the war and so the 
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elites were even free to do whatever they wanted with the resources as if those were theirs to 
exploit at will. At this also led the elites to lose touch with the people. But now, this seems to 
be long gone. A new error of popular mobilizing seems to be taking shape and the major 
demand moves around the equitable distribution of the oil revenue. This awareness and 
mobilization has been brought about by the increase level of poverty, suffering in terms of lack 
of basic needs like water and electricity for the common Angolans, yet the political class 
continues to be rich. So people feel excluded and if not checked and addressed may lead to 
anti-MPLA mobilization.  Even if it does not bring a regime change through a revolt or 
uprising, it may increase the cost of domination and weaken a legitimacy claim.  
 
3.4.6- REGIME CHANGE  
 
With a challenge should always come solution unless one barriers one’s head in the sand to 
wait and see what will happen next like the ostrich. In the case of Angola, based on the question 
that not just those we could call the elite and the common citizens have been asking, is itself a 
good sign of the consciousness of the state of affairs. The question of whether they will be 
courageous enough to move beyond the questioning and begin to do something to deal with 
these issues is another thing. And this is what is important not just for the today’s society, but 
tomorrows as well. However, a change to address these issues for many, has been narrowed 
down to one major area according to Oliveira (2015), a regime change. He disagrees with this 
view for he thinks a regime cannot revolutionize itself where you have a few elites dictating 
almost everything that happens. And he says that at the same time, “… the regime has no 
inclusive project of national development” (Oliveira, 2015:212) The elites in the party are like-
minded, and, having their hands in the common pie, they would prefer to stay that way instead 
of disturbing the current system because one does not know how a call for change could turn 
out.  
Looking at where the country has come from during the tough time with the disparate domestic 
and international trials when the country was able to stand, Oliveira (2015) believes that there 
is a possibility of a change especially when those in the system open their eyes to see that there 
is not a foreseeable future for the country. They need to establish a broad-based clientelism that 
includes a plurality of Angolans. This is possible for there is within the MPLA people who 
defend a wider distribution of resources even though their views are based on trying to block 
possible unrest and discomfort among the masses.  
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Another area that needs to be exploited more is that area public pressure. In a democratic 
system, the opposition always has a role to check the government. Based on their policies, they 
are always seen as the government in waiting. The question that many people still ask is 
whether UNITA or the other political parties are able to offer that which MPLA does not.  
Oliveira (2015) would say that many people do not believe that they are capable of articulating 
a different approach to the current system. This means that the populous are left on their own 
and without having people to give direction. This could lead to mass mobilization that can take 
any direction. Such a pressure has not been taken positively by the MPLA which has now 
resorted to harsh policing to deal with the emerging threats to its rule.  What the MPLA needs 
to do is to employ what oil rich countries have done to reach the large masses with some kind 
of disbursements to cool down the tensions.  
Taken together, the literature uggests that the peace accords prior to the Luena Memorandum 
of Understanding stagnated in the cease fire stage. The Luena Memorandum has not gone 
beyond the top leaders. This therefore means that Angola needs a more integrated peace 
framework that go in line with universally agreed strategies for sustainable peace respecting 





CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
When one carries out a study one has to define the methods used for the collection of data. One 
either uses qualitative or quantitative methods or both methods simultaneously. Data analysis 
in qualitative research is an ongoing process (Henning, 2005). Quantitative research involves 
collecting primary data from a number of different sources and making sense out of the 
observed data (Durrheim, 2006). Thus, research design “is a strategic framework for action that 
serves as a bridge between the research questions and execution or implementation of the 
research” (Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, 2006). For Senkaran (2003) the purpose of a study 
may be exploratory, descriptive or hypothesis-testing. An exploratory study aims at 
discovering new theories. It takes places in fields where less or almost nothing is available 
(Sekaran, 2003).  
Descriptive research is based on available material; it consists of describing a population, or 
phenomenon (Zikmund, 2003). Descriptive research answers questions, such as who, what, 
when, and where questions.  The present research was descriptive. It looked at the problem of 
conflict transformation in Angola.  
It is important to note that a conflict is transformed through a long process. Countries that have 
experienced conflict have shown that when avenues for peace are not taken holistically they 
tend to fail. This research was about finding out how people are dealing with the ceasefire 
signed in 2002 in Luena. 
 
4.1- RESEARCH SITES 
 
This is case study research. The case study method has the advantage of enabling the researcher 
to carry out an in-depth study of a phenomenon. Two municipalities were considered for the 
present study. Kuito-Bié in the South of Angola, and Viana in the North, respectively.   
Kuito-Bie is the capital city of Bié Province, located in Central Angola. According to the last 
census of the population it has 424.169 inhabitants (INE, 2014). Kuito-Bié was under siege 
twice during the war, first with the collapse of first elections in 1993/94, and then in 1998/99 





4.1- Map of Angola showing Kuito-Bie and Viana 




Viana is located 18 km out of Luanda, the capital city of Angola. It is one of fastest growing 
municipalities in Luanda. According to the 2014 census of the Population it has 1.525, 711 
inhabitants. This locality did not suffer the direct impact of the war. 
The two localities were chosen as research sites for comparison purposes. First, from Kuito-
Bié the researcher sought to investigate how the current peace is perceived. The same questions 
were asked in Viana where no direct confrontation took place. The results showed that both 




The population targeted was citizens living in Kuito-Bié and Viana. The aim of the research 
was to understand how peace is currently perceived in both communities.  
For the primarily quantitative (questionnaire) part of this research, a sample of 200 hundred 
respondents was used, being 100 from Kuito-Bié and 100 from Viana. This study used 
purposive and snowball sampling as sampling methods to select individuals who were either 
directly involved or indirectly affected by the armed conflict.  There were 94 males altogether, 
45 in Viana and in 49 Kuito-Bié, and 106 females altogether, 55 in Viana and in 51 Kuito-Bié. 
Thus the samples were almost equally divided with respect to gender. The average age was 37. 
The participants came from a variety of educational levels and employment backgrounds, the 
details of which are described in Chapter 5. 
For the primarily qualitative section of this research, interviews were conducted. The 
respondents that were interviewed were selected through their experience and involvement in 
the various peace processes Angola experienced. There were interviews with one member of 
MPLA, one from UNITA, one from the civil society and one from the Catholic Church. The 
researcher intended to interview three political leaders, but the member from FNLA did not 
avail himself for the interview.  
 
4.3- RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
 
The researcher constructed his own survey questionnaire. This included questions relating to 
biographical variables, experience of life since the war with respect to basic amenities, 
experiences of the war, perceptions of war, peace and reconciliation, and attitudes towards 
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dialogue and its role in community rebuilding. A copy of the questionnaire may be found in 
Appendix 1. 
For the interviews, a schedule was prepared which asked questions about security and conflict 
transformation, local peace initiatives, exposure to violence, importance of dialogue and 
reconciliation. A copy of the schedule may be found in Appendix 2. 
 
4.4- PROCEDURE  
 
Before this research could proceed, ethical clearance was obtained from the Human Social 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee at UKZN HSS/1737/015M and then gatekeeper 
permission for access to the participants was obtained from Kuito-Bié and Viana, from Mr. 
Victor Nicacio Sahombe and Mr. André Buma.  
The researcher approached the participants in church settings, schools and universities. The 
respondents were told that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw if they felt 
uncomfortable with the questionnaires being administered. Fortunately there were no incidents 
of rejection.  
The researcher explained the nature of the research and the respondents signed an agreement 
of informed consent. The agreement explained that the research was for academic purposes, 
and the responses were anonymous and that the researcher would only use the findings for 
academic purposes. This was done to avoid unethical practices during and after the research.  
The researcher asked the participants to fill in the questionnaires.  
For the interviews, the participants also signed informed consent. They were asked the 
questions and all answers were recorded and transcribed for later analysis.  
 
4.5- DATA ANALYSIS  
 
The data collected through the questionnaires were captured on an Excel Spreadsheet for 
descriptive analysis.  
The interviews were all recorded. They were then transcribed. The data from the interviews 
were then submitted to a narrative thematic (content) analysis.  
64 
 
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of the successful peace accord signed 
between the Government and the belligerent movements in the country. Thus, the investigation 
sought to compare people’s perception´s from the south of Angola vis-à- vis a society in North 
of Angola. It compared ceasefire and reconciliation, and enquired whether people found 
necessary the whole society to embark on a process of reconciliation through dialogue, leading 
to forgiveness and reconciliation. The information was gathered through the administration of 
questionnaires with semi-structured and open closed questions to 200 participants, 100 from 
Kuito- Bié and 100 from Viana.  
The interviews aimed at understanding the current stage of the peace building process and 
comparing the leadership perspective against the perspective gathered from the ground. Four 
respondents were interviewed. 
This chapter first presents the results from the questionnaires and then the interviews. The 
discussion follows in the next chapter. 
 
5.1- QUESTIONNAIRE DATA  
 
The composite table shown below summarises the quantitative data results.  Graphic 
representation follows, with a brief interpretation and analysis. Full discussion is presented in 
the next chapter - chapter six.  
Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data 
Variable   
Gender Kuito Viana 
 Male 49 45 
 Female 51 55 
Age   
 Mean  37 y 7m 36y 7m 
Education   
 Primary 1 1 
 Secondary Complete 68 30 
 Tertiary 26 66 




Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data (continued) 
Employment Kuito Viana 
 Private 17 37 
 Retired 8 2 
 Self Employed  5 9 
 State Employed  49 32 
 Unemployed 21 13 
 Unknown  0 7 
Parenthood    
 Yes  91 65 
 No 2 34 
 Unknown  7 1 
Access to School    
 Yes 85 53 
 No 6 47 
 Unknown  9 0 
War Experience    
 General Suffering during the War  96 48 
 Injury  33 12 
 Shot 24 2 
 Beaten 26 5 
 Raped 5 0 
 Lost loved one 95 61 
 Loved one injured 96 40 
 Loved one Shot 96 43 
 Loved one beaten  83 35 
Experience of Positive Peace    
 No, not at all 12 7 
 A little 45 23 
 Average  6 14 
 A lot  31 49 
 Yes, definitely  6 2 
Economic Equity    
 No, not at all 7 4 
 A little 28 3 
 Average  4 3 
 A lot  52 53 
 Yes, definitely  7 22 
Dialogue and community building    
 There is a need for dialogue to bring people together 4.1 4.6 
 To talk about the past helps to better prevent future conflicts 3.9 4 
 Political difference is a cause of conflict today  3.9 3.9 
 Lack the of dialogue is hindering the peace process  4 4.1 
 Dialogue can improve the current state of affairs  4 4.4 
 To dialogue is not to agree, but understand each other in different ways 4 4.2 




Table 5.1: Response frequencies for the questionnaire data (continued) 
Participation in Confrontation Kuito Viana 
 Did you participate in the confrontations 52 9 
 Military Participation  13 6 
 Civilian Participation  39 3 
 Unknown  48 91 
Party Support    
 MPLA 58 23 
 UNITA 4 1 
 UNKNOWN  37 76 
 FNLA 1 0 
 




Figure 5.1- Graph showing that there more female respondent in Kuito and Viana. 
During the research more women were willing to participate, both in Viana and Kuito-Bié.  
 
 


















The graph shows that Viana has more tertiary alumni than Kuito- Bié. Viana is an urban area; 
it has more tertiary institutions than Kuito-Bié. Furthermore, the years of war draw back the  
development in Kuito-Bié, the underdevelopment affected every areas of the society.   
 
 
Figure 5.3- Graph showing employment  
The graph shows that most workers are employed by the government, followed by the private 
sector. The government is the major employee in the country. The years of war have not allowed 
for the development of the private sector. Likewise, the current crisis the oil industry has 
affected the private sector that used to balance the marked. Has the graph shows that there is 
very few private initiative for creation and innovation. This is explained by the factor, that even 
in places where there foreign workers, there is lack of knowledge transfer.  
 
 


























The graph shows that there are more parents in Kuito-Bié than Viana. This explains the data on 
schooling that shows that there are more children attending school in Kuito-Bié.  
 
 
Figure 5.5- Graph showing access to school  
The study shows that Kuito- Bié has got more parents than Viana.  
 
 
Figure 5.6- Graph showing casualties during the war  
The researcher has delved into the lived experiences during the war. Analysed, the graph shows 
that there was more suffering in Kuito-Bié than Viana. In terms of direct experience, those who 






















































Viana on the hand did not experience the war first hand, but had some relatives injured and 
killed during the armed conflict.  
 
Thus, 96 percent of respondents in Kuito-Bié answered yes to the question about suffering 
during the war, whereas in Viana only 48 percent responded yes to the suffering during the 
war.  On the other hand, in Kuito-Bié 9percent lost a loved one, whereas in Viana only 43 
percent answered yes to the question.  
 




Figure 5.7- Graph showing the effects of peace.  
The peace sentiment is mixed; there are those who feel that the absence of shooting is already 
a gain. The graph shows that there is more confidence of the current peace in Viana rather than 
Kuito-Bié. The difference shows that peace needs to become a social event where people can 
feel and prosper with the dawn of a ceasefire.  To simply appreciate the end of shooting is not 
enough. Peace is a combination of factors that leads to wellbeing and development. The current 
trend, fails to show integration and significant peace sentiment. From the graph, it could be 
noticed, that there is a narrow gap between those who said, that they feel the peace effect a lot, 
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Figure 5.8- Graph showing the need for economic equity  
The respondents from both localities find it necessary to have a fair distribution of resources to 
strengthen the peace process. Equitable distribution of resources is of paramount importance 
in peace building, lack of fair distribution can work has a spoiler of positive prospects for 
sustainable peace. Respondents from both localities acknowledge that economic justice is an 
important variable for sustainable peace. 
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The graph shows that respondent from both localities find it important to engage in dialogue in 
order to prevent future conflict. Dialogue is an encounter that bridges differences and builds 
communities. Respondents from both localities showed interest in engage in dialogue, they 
also acknowledge that effective dialogue plays an irreplaceable role in bringing people 
together.    
 
 
Figure 5.10- Graph showing the participation in confrontations  
 
The graph shows that there was more participation in confrontation in Kuito-Bié than in Viana. 
Kuito-Bié suffered various attacks during the war that is why there are more participants who 
have participated in the confrontations than in Viana.  
  
 




















The graph shows that MPLA has more support than UNITA. However it is important to note 
as well that many respondents avoided the political militancy question.  
Taken together these results suggest that the current peace in Angola is negative. There is no 
economic inclusion, lack of dialogue and the whole structure misses a clear framework for 
conflict transformation 
 
5.6- ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
 
This section presents the key themes and the not the interpretation of the collected data. At the 
discussion chapter the interpretation on the findings will be dealt with.  
A summary of the interview questions and the responses is presented in Table 5.2 
Table 5.2: Interview questions with MPLA, UNITA, Catholic Church and Civil Society.  
Question  MPLA UNITA Catholic 
Church  
 Civil Society  
1. Have you been 
involved in any 
reconciliation effort, 










both parties to 
understand 
each other  
Yes, during and after 
the war. Bringing about 
awareness of the need 
of peace for 
development  
2. What you think 
caused the failure of 
Alvor, Bicesse and 
Lusaka? 
Lack of trust  Bad faith 




lack of national 
consciousness  
Immaturity of the 
Political elite of 
Angola. Rush to 
elections, lack of 
dialogue. The politians 
tried to solve the 
problem on their own 
without an inclusive 
method.  
3. Luena only dealt 
with military issues. 
When will the 
common citizen 
engage in dialogue? 






face the truth 
and dialogue 
Work towards 
informed citizenship  
4. Do you think there 
are still unresolved 
issues that can 
negatively affect the 
current situation of 
apparent calm? 
No  Yes, 
inequality is 
the source of 
all evil  
 Yes. The current model 
is neither based on 
forgiveness nor on 
reconciliation.  There a 
tentative of a national 
amnesia. The 
liberations movements 
have not gone through a 






Table 5.2: Interview questions with MPLA, UNITA, Catholic Church and Civil Society.  
(continued) 
5. Which methods can 
be used to avoid 













workshops at the all 
levels of the Society 
6. Are you aware of 
any system of conflict 
prevention in the 
country? 
No  UNITA has 




 There is no structured 
preventive system in 
country.  
7. If there still latent 
tensions between 
militants from 
different parties, how 
can citizens pass 
beyond party politics? 
Parties have to 
understand 








Yes. Partisans of the 
different parties at the 
low level are still very 
intolerant to each other  
8. There are people 
who assert that the 
liberation movements 
do not serve for the 
independent Angola, 
do you agree? 
No  No No  No 
9. Are you personally 
involved in any peace 
initiatives?  
Yes, working 
as a mediator 
for SADC 
No  No  Yes  
 
From this table it can be seen that the reconciliation process is on stalemate. The respondents 
from UNITA and MPLA acknowledged their participation in negotiation peace process and 
confirmed that mutual misunderstanding led the country into war. The representative from the 
Catholic Church participated in the process of bring awareness to people for a peace agenda. 
The civil society respondent participated in the help at grassroots as an NGO agent to bring 
awareness for peace.     
The narrative content summarized in this table also allows for thematic analysis. 





Table 5.3: Themes 
Theme Number of times 
Lack of Trust  2 
Bad faith  1 
External influence  1 
Lack of national consciousness  3 
Political Immaturity  2 
Lack of dialogue 3 
Inequality  1 
Lack of forgiveness  1 
Lack of reconciliation  1 
 
From this table it can be seen that dialogue is of paramount importance for peace.  
Taken together, the questionnaire and interview data have indicated that the country needs to 
embark on reconciliation process through dialogue.  Both the respondents from the interviews    
and the questionnaire are in agreement that peace building should unfold. The main themes 
outlined suggest that the difficulty in Angola relies on people’s ability to trust each other. This 




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION  
 
The research undertaken in Kuito-Bié and Viana sought to find out civilians´ perception of the 
current peace process. Questions concerning dialogue, economic equity, education and mutual 
acceptance were administered. The result shows some level of concern of citizens as far as 
peace is related. This part presents the main findings of the research. The chapter concludes 
with a suggestion of a strategic framework for peacebuilding in the country. 
 
6.1- DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION   
 
The findings of this research can be looked at from four aspects, gender balance, education 
(access, infrastructure and attendance), employment and parenthood. In the first place, there 
were more women than men – about 53% – due to what they went through due to their husbands 
and children being in war with many being left widows. Many men who survived were either 
handicapped or blinded. At the end of the war, schools were built, making it easier for many to 
get access especially in the government institutions with high numbers though the quality is 
poor. In Kuito-Bié, a high number of children go to school yet many fail to make it to university 
compared to Viana. Lastly, with an economy dependent on oil as a source of revenue, the 
unemployment rate is high and the private sector has not done much to fill in the gap except 
those with direct foreign investment like the Chinese. 
 
6.2- WAR EXPERIENCE  
 
This research has covered the period that goes from 1991 to 2016. The year 1991 represents 
the first attempt of the country to achieve peace with the Bicesse accords and then through 
elections. But a common mistake in African soil is to confuse democracy with elections and so 
as in many countries in Africa, electoral democracy did not work for the case of Angola.  
Civil war comes along with civilian casualties. The Angolan conflict ended with a lot of 
casualties with many survivors left with a lot of marks. Landmines, psychological trauma are 
amongst the negative effects of the conflict.  According to Heywood (2001), after the failure 
of the elections “thousands of UNITA members were hunted down in the mussesques, chopped, 
shot, machetes, went from door to door massacring anyone they suspected belonging to UNITA 
(Heywood 2002: 322). Likewise, thousands of civilians were killed in areas controlled by 
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UNITA.  The agreement in 2002 reduced violence, as put by Heywood (2011:328) “the year 
2002 reduced widespread military and state violence, but psychological trauma that Angolans 
had experienced during the entire course of civil war still remained”.  
During this period relatives were killed, injured, beaten and raped. It is a conflict that left many 
negative marks. Civilians suffered both from the side of MPLA and UNITA alike. The high 
frequency of suffering in Kuito-Bié justifies intervention as a way of amending people’s 
worries.  
Viana on the other hand did not have direct confrontations apart from riots after the general 
elections in 1992. The few incidents are from that period with others related to relatives that 
were affected elsewhere.  
Under the population size of Kuito-Bié, it is to be seen that there is a lot of pain and trauma 
from the conflict. 96% of the respondents had had a bad experience of the war. The data on 
war experience shows a clear difference between Kuito-Bié and Viana. The former had first-
hand war experience, unlike the latter. Thus, for Kuito-Bié, most of the respondents had some 
kind of negative experience during the period.  
 
6.2.1- EXPERIENCE OF POSITIVE PEACE  
 
The researcher found out that the perception of peace differed from Kuito-Bié and Viana. 
Respondents from Kuito-Bié reported a low degree of satisfaction as far as positive peace was 
concerned, whereas Viana looked at the current peace more positively. Over all, the responses 
of Kuito-Bié are negative. Given the fact that they have experienced war first hand, their 
perception of the current peace is paramount for the formulation of a peace building strategy 
that addresses the pending issues.  
 
6.2.2- ECONOMIC EQUITY  
 
Peace is not the ceasing of hostilities for it goes beyond stopping the shooting. It is a process 
that seeks to amend social injustices and economic integration that many times causes it. The 
respondents from both research sites found it very important to have a balance of distribution 
of economic revenues.  
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Angolan war was fuelled with funds from the exploration of oil and diamonds. What is 
necessary today, after the war, is to use the revenues from these resources for the betterment of 
the life of the people. Respondents from Kuito-Bié and Viana find it crucial to equitably 
distribute the reaches of the country as a way of attaining sustainable peace for the reason that 
currently there is a perception that the resources of the country are in the hands of the same 
people who used it before to fuel the war. Certain people have taken the country hostage by 
owning the oil industry, diamond and communication sectors. As such there is a perception of 
an economic inequality which can in the near future cause upheaval in the country.  
 
6.2.3- DIALOGUE AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 
 
Active dialogue as participation in the building process was a common concern of respondents 
from both municipalities. As Langmead (2009:2) puts it, dialogue “is about respectful 
conversation in which two or more parties share what they believe would be open to learning 
from each other” (2009:2). Furthermore, they agree fully in dialogue as an “exchange of 
experience and understanding between two or more partners with intention that all partners 
grow in experience and understanding” (Knitter 1985:207).  
The data on dialogue show clearly that civilians are willing to engage in the healing process 
through dialogue. Asked about the importance they give to dialogue, almost everyone agreed 
that the Angolan society needs to embark on reconciliation process through dialogue. It is 
acknowledged by respondents that dialogue is a necessary step in bringing people together. 
The encounter serves to revisit the past and heal outstanding wounds. For by journeying to the 
past, the country will be able to prevent future conflict as well as improve the situation at the 
present moment.  
The respondents positively agreed that effective dialogue can build community trust. And the 
situation in Angola requires a dialogue based on mutual trust as a way of passing beyond the 
guilty trap. Today, there is a culture of culpability.  The respondents confirmed as well that the 
lack of the dialogue can hinder the peace process as a whole.  
 
6.2.4- PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFRONTATION  
 
During war situations, civilians sometimes become involved in the fighting in order to defend 
a town under siege. In various instances in Angola, the population had to arm itself in order to 
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defend towns against opposing forces. In fact, many weapons were given out by the 
government (Heywood, 2011). From the data collected, the research found out that amongst 
the respondents who participated in the confrontation in Kuito-Bié 39 were civilians, 13 as 
military, 48 did mention the type of participation and 48 were unknown.  Viana on the hand, 
had insignificant participation in confrontation. In fact, 91 respondents did not answer the 
question concerning military participation in the confrontation.  
 
6.2.5- PARTY SUPPORT 
 
It is common in Angola not to publicly own up to be a UNITA or FNLA militant. This is for 
the reason that most institutions are party controlled. To say that a person is UNITA and works 
in the public sector is challenging. Thus, the data on party affiliation was affected by the 
sentiment of fear.  
During the research it was found that most people in Kuito-Bié supported MPLA. And in Viana 
most people did not respond to the question of party affiliation.   
 
6.2.6- INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE BUILDING BY LEADERS IN COUNTRY  
 
There are many ways of attaining a ceasefire, either through dialogue and mediation, or through 
defeat in the battlefield. Angolan cease-fire, was a result of the latter. Its process was through 
the agreement of belligerent forces, both MPLA respondent and UNITA respondent agree that 
the current peace which was a result of Luena agreement was possible due to the weakened 
UNITA. War was not sustainable. The nature of the conflict whereby opposing movements 
fought for autonomy, the military always determine how peace should go about.  The military 
always perceive that because they cause the war they should be the one to seek peace. 
Therefore, the civil society and the Church in general, particularly the Catholic Church had an 
informal role to play. Thus, the eternal question remains, if the militaries are the ones who sued 
for peace, why did Alvor, Lusaka and Bicesse Accords fail?  
 
6.2.7- REASON BEHIND THE FAILURE OF BICESSE AND LUSAKA  
 
The war left many negative marks in the country. This section, briefly looks at the negative 
consequences of the armed conflict. It seeks to investigate the reasons behind the failures of 
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the accords and suggests ways of actions for the success of Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
The year 2002 represents a change in Angola. The war ended and a new era dawned for the 
country. However, the road that brought the end to war started officially in 1991 in Bicesse and 
in 1994 in Lusaka. According to the interviewees, the reasons behind the failure of the previous 
accords were lack of trust among political parties (MPLA; UNITA), external influence and 
lack of national consciousness (Catholic Church). Further the intervenient to the process lacked 
political maturity. As the interviewee from the civil society puts it “the movements were not 
ready for the transition, they were challenged to move from one party system to multiparty 
democracy; they were challenged to accept each other as belonging to the same process of 
transformation” (Civil Society). Another important player was the international community. 
And in the words of the representative from the Catholic Church, “The ‘godfathers’ in the 
Angolan peace process failed the country. They helped the accords to be signed, but never 
oversaw it fully implemented” (Catholic Church). The international community that helped the 
country to reach the agreements, did not show interest also in looking for the new avenues for 
negotiation after the agreements collapsed (Anstee, 1996). Without the real interest of the 
international community the worrying parties victimized civilians at their will for hegemonic 
power.  
The failure of these two accords had devastating consequences, as Messiant asserts (2004:16) 
the failure of Bicesse and Lusaka “resulted on a resumption of the war, with ever more deadly 
consequences for the civil population”.   
The main points found during the research suggest that the peace agreement did not work due 
to lack of trust and the inability of UNITA and MPLA to work together. Messiant (2004) adds 
another point by saying that, “by the hegemonic power by the two warring parties a deadly 
pursuit of military victory” influenced the collapse of the accords.  
 
6.3- THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT 
 
The Angolan war can be said to have been sponsored by international players. The United 
States and the Soviet Union played a vital role, both in sponsoring the war and in supporting 
the peace process. The negotiation for the first accord were overseen by the Troika, composed 
of Portugal, USA and USSR. The negotiators, mainly the United States forced MPLA to 
abandon Marxism-Leninism and to opt for democracy. The Troika, was in a sense representing 
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its own interest with the principle of conflict transformation was being ignored and not 
respected. Therefore, “the unarmed actors in Angola, moral, political, civic, had no role in the 
negotiation or any say in the implementation of the accords” (Messiant, 2004:18). This absence 
of unarmed actors favoured the collapse of accords, as Comefords (2007:7) puts it: 
“… had the agreements sought to include society and community based 
organizations, religious institutions and women groups, historians and other 
political parties in Angola, it is possible that such input could have shaped the of 
the final agreements themselves, placing greater emphasis on transparency and 
accountable governance”  
The international community’s main objective was not to reach peace. What they seem to have 
being after is to have UNITA into power. That is why they deployed very weak UN personnel 
to oversee the process. As Anstee (1996) rightly observes, the UN lacked a clear mandate, 
money, and personnel for a proper peace operation. 
 
6.3.1- CORE REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF THE BICESSE AND LUSAKA 
ACCORDS 
 
The international community with its biased role in the process can be said to have led to the 
failure of the accords and which was summed up by what the representative from the Catholic 
Church said about the influence of international community. Because Troika had its own 
interest, the process became vicious. The United States supported UNITA, and for them a 
victorious outcome from the ballots was almost guaranteed. So the international community 
ignored signs of re-escalation of the conflict and conventional mechanism applied after 
ceasefire, and working towards reconciliation was overlooked. For example, disarming of 
conflicting parties as a way of preparing elections as an important tool was taken lightly. In the 
Angolan case, the disarmament process was over looked. Right before the elections there were 
clear signs of the war resuming, but these signs were ignored. And so when the ballot was cast 
and UNITA lost, Savimbi refused to accept the results and war re-escalated. Many UNITA 
leaders were killed in Luanda and many other centres in Angola. Anyone perceived to have 
voted for UNITA, or who wore any distinctive signs of UNITA became victims of a post-
election violence that killed over five hundred people.  
Messiant (2004:18) argues that the Accord at Bicesse was badly conducted, “… the transition 
was placed entirely in the hands of the armed parties. Transitory political rules were not 
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established, nor was a coalition government which would have avoided a wins takes it all” put 
in place. Before the election, the parties never agreed to have a common body to prepare the 
elections as a guarantee of impartiality in the electoral process. In a sense, both political parties 
were immature and lacked clear vision of what to do in order to secure peace (Civil Society 
respondent).  
It was in the environment of armed groups that the election took place. The MPLA won 54 per 
cent of the votes, over UNITA’s 34 per cent. José Eduardo Santos won the presidential election 
by 49.7 per cent while Savimbi got 40.7 per cent of the votes cast. The presidential results were 
not conclusive. However Savimbi rejected the whole process and war resumed. What followed 
this rejection was a bloodshed. Messiant (2004) asserts MPLA launched a “pre-emptive attack 
on UNITA” because they feared UNITA would attack the capital Luanda.   
 
6.3.2- THE FAILURE OF LUSAKA PROTOCOL 
 
After the unsuccessful Bicesse, the United States of America, who supported UNITA changed 
its support and began to recognize the Angolan government with UNITA being as labelled as 
rebel movement after they returned to war.  As a consequence, UNITA was sanctioned by the 
UN, therefore,access to weapons was restricted.  
The UN through Alioune Blondin Beye and the Troika started negotiation with UNITA and 
MPLA to go back to the negotiation table. In 1994 the parties agreed to negotiate and signed 
the Lusaka Protocol. But with the lesson learnt from the failure of Bicesse, the negotiators 
proposed a new route for the settlement. A Government of National Unity for Reconciliation 
(GURN) was suggested. The second clause was to take disarmament seriously contrary to what 
had happened in Bicesse. Further, the second round for the presidential elections was to be 
scheduled.   
One important element of Lusaka is that, because UNITA had rejected the previous elections 
results and it was now considered an illegal rebellion, as mentioned before, the consequence 
was that they were the only ones who were supposed to disarm, and their personnel to be 
incorporate in the national army. The leadership of UNITA procrastinated the fulfilment of the 
protocol and the Government did not take extra efforts to endorse the agreement. As put by 
Messiant (2004: 22) “UNITA violated the agreement by day, the government by night”. The 
consequences of the constant violations “fuelled mutual distrust and led to re-armament of both 
sides”. Even though UNITA was under sanctions, and Bicesse had forbade any country in 
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supporting them with weaponry material, they did so illegally while the government was able 
to buy arms dealings with other governments.  
Despite the inauguration of GURN in 1997 the situation in the country continued to escalate to 
full violence. The UN that helped the agreement to be reached, abandoned its mandate and 
from 1998 full escalation devastated the country.  
Taken together, the agreements failed because of false interests of Troika combined with 
mistrust amongst the worrying parties. Authors such as Messiant (2004), Comeford (2007), 
Ruigrok (2011), and Heywood (2011) have drawn support for the hypothesis that lack of 
inclusion of other segments of society hinder the success of the peace.  
  
6.3.4-  LUENA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING  
 
The year 2002 marked the end of the civil war in Angola. The Death of Savimbi, the president 
of UNITA, left the movement without any possibility to continue the fight. The Angolan 
government negotiated an agreement to officially stop hostilities. Right in Luena where 
Savimbi died, the two armies agreed on an immediate ceasefire and, further, they agreed on 
working on what had failed in the Lusaka Protocol, mainly those issues dealing with the 
disarmament of UNITA personnel and consequent demilitarization and reintegration. As far as 
reconciliation was concerned, a general amnesty was granted to all UNITA militants for their 
war crimes.  
The Luena Memorandum signed in 2002 focused its attention in military issues. As mentioned 
above, reconciliation was restricted to the blanket amnesty for war crimes. At the time of the 
agreement the UN showed unhappiness for a process of reconciliation that forgives without 
justice when it said, “The United Nations does not recognize general amnesty for crimes against 
humanity and for violations of international and humanitarian law and crime” (UN, 2002:8). 
With the same token, Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:185) asserts that 
“When wars have ended, post-conflict peacebuilding is vital. The UN has often 
devoted too little attention and too few resources to this critical challenge. 
Successful peacebuilding requires the deployment of peacekeepers with the right 




What the authors argue is that the UN has to have a more influential role in peacebuilding. 
Angola has experienced the problems with UN’s incomplete framework for desired change in 
Angola, for most of its agreements only dealt with military issues.  
As it happened in in previous agreements for peace, the civilian population is not considered 
in the reconciliation process in Luena Memorandum of understanding. It is true that the 
population is enjoying the cease-fire, through the stopping of violence. However, there are 
other matters to be addressed. The government assumed that reconciliation is and forgiveness 
happens without a proper process. As quoted by Monteiro (2004:66), the Lusaka Protocol 
suggests that “… in the spirit of National Reconciliation, all Angolans should forgive and forget 
the offences resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the future with tolerance and trust”. 
The statement assumes that peace can be achieved by forgetting the horrors from the war.  
 
6.3.5- RECONCILIATION AFTER LUENA  
 
After the Memorandum in Luena the peace process stopped at the cease-fire stage, meaning 
that “… to a large extent hostilities have stopped or limited to certain regions; however, the 
root or structural causes of the conflict are not addressed and so the reconciliation of different 
parties and/or communities has no priority” (Langer, 2006:5).    
To address a conflict properly it is necessary to identify the key problems disputed. The 
Angolan war had as root cause, of mistrust and the inability of the liberation movements to 
share power. The greed to govern led the country into a long bloodshed. The process to resolve 
these problems takes a long time to be achieved. During the post conflict era many core 
problems evolved, the main one is the notion of a victor´s peace. The MPLA defeated UNITA 
in the battle field. They perceive themselves as winners. There is little room to compromise in 
order for a more balanced process to occur. The effects of the victor´s peace are intolerance, 
hatred, corruption, dysfunctional institutions and favouritism for MPLA partisans (UNITA and 
Civil Society Respondents).  
The reconciliation process is at a stalemate, the military perceives that the peace has been 
achieved and there is nothing to be done as asserted by Raimundo (2004:66): 
“… although national reconciliation continues to be invoked as an important 
aspect of consolidating peace in Angola, in the political arena it has basically 
amounted to the reconciliation of the warring parties without exploring the causes 
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of the conflict. Little attention has been paid to the social processes that enable 
individuals and communities to address and overcome the distrust, polarization 
and pain caused by conflict”  
 
The pain and suffering of people are not acknowledged publicly as an issue to deal with. And 
in the reconciliation process, it is very important to face the truth. The acknowledgement of 
past events can only happen if perpetrators and victims agree to dialogue, decide to join forces 
for a common cause. This has been lacking and because in the case of Angola where there are 
many truths about the cause of the conflict, it is important a complete engagement so that the 
many truths are amalgamated to one so that the country moves forward.  
Lederach proposes an integrated framework as discussed extensively in chapter 2, now the 
pyramidal framework will be used to respond the Angolan need for a complete framework for 
peace building.  
 
6.4- LEDERACH’S FRAMEWORK AS GROUNDS FOR TRANSFORMATION IN 
ANGOLA 
 
The Angolan peace process has been largely militarized. The process did not include the civil 
society, the churches, and community based organisations (Civil Society Respondent). The 
consequence is that people are still intolerant to each other. There are still scenes of violence 
in various communities due to party politics. The need for the involvement of members from 
different layers of the community is urgent. 
Lederach´s (2003; 2005; 2003; 2007) work on peace building fosters human relationship as a 
ground for interconnectedness and a shared vision for the future. The researcher finds it 
appropriate to use the integrated framework having in mind that the main aim is to ameliorate 
people’s relationship that is the way they look to each other. This integrated framework is 
composed of three main role players symbolized on pyramid. First there is the top level 
leadership, followed by the middle-range leadership and lastly the grassroots leadership. All 
these players have specific roles to play and outcomes to achieve. 
 
6.4.1- TOP LEVEL LEADERSHIP  
 
Top leadership in a conflict transformation environment involves, high ranking military 
personnel, politicians and church leaders.  The role of these representative of the people is to 
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broker peace when there is a conflict. However, it must be mentioned that the military and 
politicians are very often at the genesis of a conflict. For the case of Angola, politicians and 
the military were the cause of the intrastate conflict.  
At the time for the peace settlement, military and the politicians felt that because they caused 
the war they should be the one to solve it. They then took the role of solving the problem alone 
leaving out other important players from the civil society and church leaders. The Angolan 
conflict therefore confirms the theory that top-level leadership represents the highest visible 
leaders in a conflict, consequently the key players in cease fire processes, as Lederach 
(1997:38) asserts “in an intrastate struggle, these people are the highest representative leaders 
of the government and opposition movements”. These top leaders played the role of cease fire 
negotiators. Therefore, we had representatives from the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and 
UNITA armed forces (FALA) signing the agreement on 4th of April 2002. They were at the 
time the highest visible persons in the ceasefire process. According to Lederach, the peace 
process that initiates from top leaders is top-down approach to peacebuilding, whose first aim 
is to achieve a cease fire agreement as he (1997:44) asserts:  
“Peacebuilding approach at this level is often focused on achieving a cease-fire or 
a cessation of hostilities as a first step that will lead to subsequent steps involving 
broader political and substantive negotiations, which in turn will culminate in an 
agreement creating the mechanisms for a political agreement from war to peace.” 
 
6.4.2- MIDDLE RANGE  
 
Middle range persons are influential in society without a directly being linked to the official 
power structure but influences change in a society.  Lederach (1997) points out that a middle 
range person can be characterized differently. First, it is someone who is an actor and can be 
influential, is much respected or occupies important portfolios in the society. Secondly, the 
leadership can be broadened to institutions and groups networks, such as football clubs, 
religious denominations, and academic institutions. A third approach in words of Lederach 
(1997:41): 
“Is to concentrate on identity groups in conflict, and to locate middle range leaders 
among people who are well known as belonging to minority ethnic group, or who 
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are from a particular geographic region within the conflict and enjoy the respect 
of the people of that region but are also known outside the region.” 
This second approach is paramount for Angola. So far, this layer of conflict transformation has 
not been utilized. The resources from local communities have not been used. In tackling the 
current stalemate in the process, it will be important to concentrate on the dynamic of North 
and South, Ovimbundo versus Kimbundo because the genesis of the conflict has got an ethnic 
tone to it. To solve this difference, it will be very important to apply the process of the middle 
range approach which goes beyond the effect and addresses the root causes. By selecting 
influential people in the community, it will be possible to connect with influential people at the 
top level, “… middle-range leaders are positioned so that they are likely to know and be known 
by top level leadership, yet they have significant connections to the broader context and the 
constituency that the top leaders claim to represent” (Lederach, 1997:41).  
Middle range leaders, if integrated properly, represent a swing vote in the peace building 
process. At this level people “are trained for peace though problem solving workshops, conflict 
resolution training and the development of peace commissions” (Lederach, 1997:46). It is 
important for Angola to diversify its peace agenda and to be inclusive. 
 
6.4.3- GRASSROOTS  
 
The grassroots are the bottom of the pyramid, they represent the general population and very 
often the first to face the negative effect of a civil war, but the last to be contemplated in the 
reconciliation process. For the peace process in Angola, they were not considered whatsoever. 
So, as much as reconciliation of civilians affected by war is considered to be the backbone of 
a peace process, Angolans have been left out by the top leaders who signed and drafted the 
various peace agreements. As Monteiro (2004:65) has rightly noted “… although the war [In 
Angola] and its consequences have been extensively written about, individual traumas and 
collective suffering are scarcely mentioned either in private or in public”, people are victims 
that have no avenue to be heard. Thus, the grassroots are people whose “life is characterized, 
particularly in settings of protracted conflict and war, by survival mentality” (Lederach, 
1997:42).  
The leaders at the grassroots operate and interact with the community on daily basis. They are 
people involved in local communities’ organizations and are “people [who] understand 
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intimately the fear and suffering with which much of the population must live” (Lederach, 
1997:42).    
The grassroots faces peace building from a bottom-up strategy, even though these are people 
who suffer on daily basis with the lack of basic needs, they have a role to play in peace building. 
Taken together, these approaches suggest that peace building has to be a combined effort from 
the various groups in a given society. The top leadership alone cannot achieve sustainable 
peace, neither can the middle range alone. It has to be a threefold approach, top-leadership, 
middle and the grassroots.  
This means that Angola needs to combine forces from its political mosaic, church leaders, 
business people and common Angolans in order to have in place a more integrated peace 
strategy that will be able to address the needs of dialogue for change and sustainable peace.  
6.5-ANGOLAN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: WHO DOES WHAT?  
 
From cease-fire to full reconciliation, there are a number of issues that have to be considered, 
all bearing in mind that to achieve sustainable peace is a process that “revolves around a need 
to or desire to address incompatibilities by changing a situation” (Coleman et al. 2014: 723).  
Any peace process has to have a framework so that systematically sustainable peace can be 
attained. Dialogue, either official or unofficial, plays an important role to reconcile a society. 
Respondents, both from Kuito-Bié and Viana are in agreement that to dialogue helps to prevent 
future conflicts and gives strength to the current peace process. Chapter 2 devoted time to types 
of dialogue. Thus, a framework for Angola should base on the concepts of dialogue, forgiveness 
and reconciliation. The current peace process in Angola is in state of “stable unresolvedness” 
(Langer, 2006:5). The state of unresolvedness is the absence of clarification of the root causes 
of a conflict making it difficult for any meaningful peace process.  
Taking into consideration Lederach´s integrated framework, the research suggests roles to be 










The first mandate of the leadership is to achieve an agreement that facilitates a cease-fire. This 
having been achieved, the current Angolan leaders have to be involved in other activities. In 
Lederach´s perspective, these leaders are highly visible and can be drivers of change. The 
researcher suggests that their role in order to climb the transformation ladder is to create a 
political climate as “the total experience of social-psychological environment in which the 
conflict transformation and the peace building process takes place” (Langer, 2006:33). This 
calm climate for healthy political encounter has been spoiled by the conflict. As a consequence 
there is a culture of fear and hatred and it is the leadership that can help to ameliorate the 
shortcomings.  
Moreover, the leadership should create a favourable climate so that citizens see the future with 
confidence. Hopelessness is not a good recipe for reconciliation. It is through looking at the 
future with confidence that a common future can be dreamed of and reconciliation unfold. As 
Langer (2006:34) puts it, “Reconciliation is a joint process of releasing the past with its pain, 
restructuring the present with reciprocal respect and acceptance, and reopening the future to 
new risks and spontaneity”.  
A more confident future will come about in Angola once the peace process takes the right 
direction. The first step towards that desired outcome is a process of truth telling. The aim of 
disclosing the reasons behind the conflict is to heal the perpetrators and victims. It is very 
important to understand, how and why things happen the way they did.  
Currently, we do have two histories for the same memory. When UNITA militants are heard, 
they recount the history from their perspective, when it is MPLA militants, they recount their 
triumphant version of events. The difference in the histories they share does not help 
reconciliation because they give two different accounts of the same event. As Langer (2006:67) 
suggests, “… to understand the why and how actions is a pre-condition for any reconciliation 
policy”. For the Angolan situation, the main objective in truth telling will not be to find guilty 
and innocent participants in the war, rather it is to facilitate a dialogue that will help 
cohabitation amongst the various political players in the country.  
6.5.2- ECONOMIC EQUITY  
 
Another important role to be played by the top-leadership is to promote economic equity, 
because reconciliation with empty stomachsin peacebuilding does not work. The war process 
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had created a lot economic injustices. The state favoured, state security instead of human 
security. Respondents from Kuito-Bié and Viana agree that a more balanced economy will help 
a better integration in the society. In fact, currently the level of dissatisfaction is on the rise. 
Fourteen years after the peace agreement things are falling apart. As discussed in chapter 3, 
Angola is rich in natural resources but most of the revenue from the oil industry and diamond 
has gone towards funding the war rather than positive human development. And now with the 
end of the war, citizens are clambering for a more equitable distribution of the resources. This 
matter has caused discontent in Cabinda, an enclave in the North of Angola. The respondent 
from UNITA also pointed out the need of economic inclusion for peace building.  
In summary, the top-leaders have to strengthen public institutions to become more democratic. 
They need to foster dialogue to help a new model of cohabitation to come about. However, the 
full picture of reconciliation can only take place if the other players on the pyramid are taken 
into consideration.   
 
6.5.2- MIDDLE RANGE  
 
The middle range plays an important role for peace yet for the Angolan case the identification 
of important key players in this level has not been done. Unlike Lederach´s proposal where the 
Church leaders are in the top-leadership, for Angola it is suggested that the religious leaders 
are solely placed in the middle range, the reason being that religious leaders have not been 
involved so much in formal transformation activities. They were vocal during the conflict 
years, but today nothing much takes places on consistent manner. By placing them at the middle 
range leadership, they become good mediators between the top leaders and grassroots, and, 
most importantly, they can participate in the change process through the sermons at the Church 
services.  
Middle range leaders are placed in position that can influence top leaders and grassroots as 
well. Lederach (1997) suggests that they take this key role in problem solving through 
workshops. The aim of these problem solving workshops is to invite participants who know 
the story of the conflict and also to try and influence top leaders. Secondly, it is important that 
the workshop takes place on an informal environment. “An environment that enables direct 
interaction with adversaries and encourages the development of relationships as well as 
flexibility in looking at the parties´ shared problems and possible solutions” (Lederach, 
1997:47). These Training workshops are of paramount importance for Angola. For Lederach 
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(1997) the workshops provide multiple services by facilitating encounters amongst warring 
parties and providing resource persons for training. As alluded before, the key finding of this 
research is that respondents find dialogue an important feature for peace structure. 
Another important element of Lederach´s (1997:48), middle range leadership is the conflict 
resolution training which aims at raising awareness about conflict dynamics. Conflict 
resolution training has the goal of “teaching people specific techniques and approaches for 
dealing with conflict often in terms of analytical, communication, negotiation, or mediation 
skills”. The post war Angolan society needs extensive training on an integrated peace 
framework which can help the people to see each other as struggling for the same future.  
Taken together, looking at the top leadership and the middle leadership in the Angolan context, 
it is suggested that their action should be directed towards a more integrative framework at the 
grassroots. Those at the bottom of the pyramid have a role to play, even though they are often 
affected by either during confrontations by being victims of armed forces, both from the rebel 
side or the government, or after cease-fire struggling with daily worries of how to survive, their 
voices ought to be heard. The Angolan process has completely overlooked the grassroots 
leadership. Yet for a process to be integrated, as it is suggested here, the way to sustainable 
peace has to be complete. 
 
6.5.3- GRASSROOTS  
 
Grassroots are the oppressed that need to liberate and to liberate themselves. It is difficult for 
the oppressor to be changed by those they oppressed. For this framework to work, the 
grassroots plays pivotal role in changing the status quo of Angola reconciliation. However, as 
the grassroots citizens seek their dignity though a process of reconciliation, revenge has no 
place for it is an encounter that uplifts both the oppressor and the oppressed. As quoted by 
Ramsbotham and Miall (2005:215) Paulo Freire attests that: 
“The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labour, for the 
overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men and women as persons…is 
possible only because dehumanization although a concrete historical fact, is not a 
given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the 
oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed. Because it is a distortion of 
becoming more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed 
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struggle against them who made them so, in order for this struggle to have 
meaning the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity become in 
turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restores of humanity of both.” 
In chapter 2, the importance and role played by the grassroots reconciliation was presented as 
made up of two trends, family reconciliation and group reconciliation respectively. Further 
inside into the liberal peace as peacebuilding from below followed. However, this research 
favours Lederach´s insight on grassroots.  
Ledearch’s (1997) approach widens the spectrum of the grassroots activities for peace building. 
He sees the grassroots as having a leeway to pressure for peace because they are the ones who 
most of the time face the real consequences of the war. They therefore have the bargaining 
power to improve reconciliation efforts. A clear example of the importance of grassroots 
importance in peacebuilding comes from Liberia where the women’s league pressured for a 
cease fire and it was achieved.  
The Angolan context needs a more informed grassroots in order for the society to change. Like 
any other conflict situation, they have suffered during the war period and continue to suffer 
today. And so if in times of killings, grassroots pressure for peace, in time of peacebuilding 
they should pressure for change.  
Taken together the three models can be applied into Angolan situation as one single model. 
Specific roles have been outlined, and there is a need for a follow-up in order for full 
reconciliation to be attained.  
 
 
6.6.1- CONTEXTUALIZATION  
 
The way forward for the Angolan peace process passes through strengthening peace building 
from below which is a bottom-up approach.  The grassroots have suffered the worst war 
consequences. If they depend on the top-leaders to free them it will take a longer time than they 
expect. In as much as it has to be an integrated framework whereby top-leaders strengthen 
public institutions and promote truth telling, and the middle range promote conflict resolution 





6.6.2- THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACEBUILDING FROM BELOW – BOTTOM-UP 
 
It is common place for the grassroots to be ignored during peace settlement. They are often the 
weakest link in peace building processes. The researcher suggests peace building from below 
as the guiding framework for the Angolan situation. What has happened until now in Angola 
has been top down framework. This approach has produced negative peace, whereas the peace 
building from below will produce a more integrated approach. 
The bottom-up approach will be strengthened by the concepts of dialogue as effective 
communication, and reconciliation and forgiveness as the decisive steps towards sustainable 
peacebuilding.  
 
6.6.3- THE PROCESS OF BOTTOM-UP PEACEBUILDING  
 
Peace from below is a process that acknowledges that “ sustainable peace making processes 
must be based not merely on the manipulation of peace agreements made by elites, but more 
importantly on the empowerment on communities torn apart by war” (Ramsbotham and Miall, 
2005:215). When common citizen become aware of their role as peace makers the process 
begins to unfold. More importantly, peace-making from below opens up participatory public 
political spaces for citizens to participate in the changing process. The method at the bottom-
up approach aims at training peace agents that help to change the communities they are 
involved in. in some ways, this bottom up approach is an indigenous empowerment process. 
One of the most important characteristics of peace building from below is to liberate 
communities from dominating structures; the current peace process in Angola, is on the status 




CHAPTER 7- RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS   
 
A framework for Angola will be focused on grassroots initiatives. Thus, far top-down 
approaches have produced negative peace. Bottom-up have the chance of bringing change to 




The key element in conflict resolution from below is that the people at the grassroots enlighten 
the solution of the problem. No outsiders bring ready-made solutions, rather it is the real people 
that have suffered the horrors of the war that seek for ways of solving pending issues. There 
are a number of possibilities of grassroots organizations. One important feature of grassroots 
organizations is the presence of both international and community based non-governmental 
organizations.  For the case, of Angola, there is an urgency for real community based NGOs to 
be builders and developers of peace trainers to bring awareness to the community. Today, there 
are some NGOs working on the field of human rights promotion. These NGOS have already 
served as an alternate voice for the peace process in Angola. In late 1990s they appeared 
appealing for a true peace process. Organizations such as Angolan Action for Development 
(AAD) and Action for Rural Development and the Environment were formed after 1991, 
although their main role was to deal with rural development they helped to bring awareness to 
people, by showing that another way is possible.  
The Christian Churches also represented a great shift. As independent participants they have 
greatly influenced the peace agenda of the country by advocating for peace during war period. 
The shortcomings of these organizations is that they depend solely on international funding. At 
the grassroots level it is important not to be so dependent on aid, but rather the search for local 
donors so that peace promotion does not become a business.  
Taken together, it can be observed, that although the peace process from below is not widely 
publicized, it has the potential to be a driver of change. Using Lederach´s model, but placing 
the emphasis at the bottom of the pyramid is a guarantee for a change in the Angolan peace 
stalemate. The bottom-up approach sets medium-term perspective at the instructional level and 
national building within the long-term goal of human security-oriented peacebuilding and 




7.2- RECONCILIATION  
 
The researcher finds important an agenda to reconcile the country as way of bringing about 
sustainable peace. Reconciliation implies togetherness. It is an act of conflicting parties 
deciding to march to a common destiny. As Assefa and Washira (1996:42) affirm, “… 
reconciliation refers to the act by which people who have been apart and split off from one 
another begin to march together again. It is the restoration of broken relationships”. Thus “… 
reconciliation is both a goal - something to achieve - and a process - a means to achieve that 
goal” (Bloomfield, 2003:12). The Angola situation is clear example of a broken relationship at 
the societal level. The main political parties do not see eye to eye, they keep a rather informal 
and false relationship.  
The MPLA, who won the elections for three times, in 2008, 1992 and in 2012, show arrogance 
and an unwillingness to compromise. The country’s hegemonic power and regional influence 
has given partisans of MPLA a sense of self-sufficiency that others are irrelevant ( De Oliveira, 
2015). The arrogance coming from the top of the ladder affects common militants whose 
relationships are deeply broken. The amendment of relationships will be a great remedy 
towards healthier grassroots peace initiatives. A goal is something desirable, at the end the day 
the goal of reconciliation is to see the society where people are able to relate freely without 
grudges from confrontation periods. Thus, for this goal to be achieved, it is important to focus 
on the process. A process gives prevalence and preference to the present moment as the right 
time to work for change.  
At the time of the peace at the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the issue of 
reconciliation was narrowed down to amnesty, war crimes had a blanket forgiveness. The way 
the government dealt with issue did help people to relate and reconcile. The choice of grassroots 
as preferential model for peace building in Angola obliges the society to undergo the process 
of reconciliation as  
“… an over-reaching process which includes the search for truth, justice, 
forgiveness and healing… it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies- 
not necessarily to love them or forgive them or forget the past on any way, but to 
coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our 
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society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had 
separately” (Bloomfield, 2003:12). 
To reconcile means to accept, to move forward and design a new future for a once victimized 
community. People at the grassroots have suffered consequences of a war that was driven by 
greed and ambition to govern by the liberation movements in Angola, As a consequence, once 
united communities were separated, relationships broke. To face eye to eye after violent 
conflict is a challenge for any community that envisions a productive future.  Concisely, 
“reconciliation is a process through which a society moves form a divided past to a shared 
future” (Bloomfield, 2003:12). Reconciliation processes remind societies that any successful 
future depends on level of seriousness of a peace process. Instead of avoiding pending issues a 
society coming out a conflict should look at its past as way of getting out of an enslaving past 
preventing the moving forward the society towards a desired future. 
The Angolan conflict was deeply rooted in difference, contradiction, polarization and violence 
that seriously fragmented the society at large, which makes reconciliation delicate and difficult 
(Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005; Bloomfield, 2003:12) 
Given the Angolan context, reconciliation is a sensitive ground to step on. There is need for a 
clear process that unfolds methodologically and constantly. Thus attitudes and conduct have to 
change towards each other and the community.  Events of violence because of party affiliation 
need to be resolved. Furthermore, the members of the community should elucidate the fear of 
the neighbour who was once the opposition during the conflict period. When fear is overcome, 
trust in the community can be built, and empathy can unfold. All the mentioned steps can take 
place when traumas and atrocities from the war period are properly addressed.   
 
7.3- DEALING WITH THE PAST 
 
The ability to live in the present moment, the here and now is crucial to move towards 
reconciliation. At times, the reconciliation process is hindered by past memories that make 
former enemies to look at each with anger and remorse. To move beyond hate is crucial for the 
mending of broken relationships. 
Before full reconciliation it is necessary “for individuals and groups to recover from trauma, 
and for the time-bomb of remembered injustice to be defused” (Ramsbotham and Miall, 
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2005:227). Communities can only dream a common future once they have moved beyond past 
injustices.  
Dealing with the past is complex endeavour, it is much easier, after a cease-fire to recover 
infrastructure than to deal with the invisible effects of the war.  However, there will be no full 
reconciliation if the psychological traumas are not addressed.  
The researcher suggests grassroots truth commissions as way for the Angolan people to address 
the past, as extensively presented in chapter 2, the truth commissions have the ability to allow 
people to share their experience without revenge. The advantage of this method to deal with 
past is that it is contextual and local leaders and common citizens are fundamental players in 
the process of reconciliation. The truth commissions help societies to acknowledge past hurts 
and victims and perpetrators start to move on. By the same token, truth commissions will help 
to clarify the root causes of the conflict and help communities to go beyond the guilt trap. 
Furthermore, truth commission restore justice. For Angola the restoration of justice is 
paramount for the success of the current existing negative peace. Peace without justice is an 
ingredient for the re-escalation of violence.  
In all, reconciliation means to end violence, to overcome polarization, managing contradiction 
and celebrating difference (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005). These three elements are crucial for 
true reconciliation given that no society can fully reconcile if there is still deep-seated political 
animosity. Angola reached its ceasefire through the defeat of UNITA. The victorious mentality 
makes difficult for MPLA´s partisans for forgive UNITA and move forward. As Ramsbotham 
and Miall (2005:243) put it, “it is hard to forgive a defeated enemy, and harder to forgive a 
finally victorious enemy, it is harder still to forgive an enemy who is still seen to be an 
immediate and potent threat”. In as much as UNITA is much weaker than the MPLA, they are 
still seen as a possible threat by MPLA, given that they challenge the hegemonic power. This 
animosity happens at the top of the pyramid as well as at the bottom. Since the way forward 
for peacebuilding passes through the grassroots, consciousness of their role as peace builders  
makes it important to move beyond political indifference. “The deeper process of reconciliation 
cannot be reached while dehumanization images of the enemy are still current and mutual 
convictions of victimization are widely believed” Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005:244).  
When perpetrators and victims are rehumanized, conflicting demands are met. These demands 
include a better sense of security and a better future for children in a given community.  In as 
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much as individual problems are not managed, the sense of a common security moves 
reconciliation forward.  
With the issues of economic rearrangement dealt with, political representation considered, 
reconciliation moves to a more decisive step, based on atonement and forgiveness. Here 
“former enemies are reconciled to the point where differences are not only tolerated but, even 
appreciated” (Ramsbotham and Miall, 2005:244). Reconciled societies are the ones that 
acknowledge that a shared vision for the future is more important than a divided past.  
The movement towards reconciliation in Angola has to undergo the three stages mentioned 
above. Moving towards acknowledgement of everyone´s similarity at the same time as the 
common destiny of the community is appreciated. The MPLA party which is leading now, 
should be transformed, both with the top leadership as well at the grassroots. Transformation 
at the grassroots can happen through including at the syllabus right from primary school themes 
relating to peace and reconciliation.     
When reconciliation reaches its highest point, forgiveness unfolds. To forgive is not to forget. 
The researcher uses forgiveness as a tool to accept a past experience and move forward.  
Forgiveness occurs when people no longer define their emotions, desires or behaviours in the 
terms of injury – the injury becomes part of who people are, but they are not defined by it 
(Lulofs and Cahn, 2000).  
 
7.4- FORGIVENESS  
 
In chapter 2 forgiveness was discussed. It was established that forgiveness goes hand in hand 
with reconciliation. Whenever the issue of reconciliation comes about in war torn societies, the 
issue of forgiveness is dealt with. As presented above, forgiveness is the highest point in the 
reconciliation process. Lulofs and Cahn (2000:326) define “forgiveness as cognitive process 
that consists of letting go of feelings of revenge and desire to retaliate” it is the ability that 
people have to live together after violent experience. It is agreed that “forgiveness in an 
important mental process that should follow traumatic experiences” (Lulofs and Cahn, 
2000:328). The process of forgiving replaces anger and transforms anger into a positive energy. 
“The key in getting into the point of forgiveness is the ability to reframe the event that has 
occurred, to see an event among many in a relationship instead of the central event that defines 
the guilty of the relationship” (Lulofs and Cahn, 2000:331). In chapter 2, an overview of 
different schools were presented. The views are divided amongst scholars who affirm 
98 
 
forgiveness in not a pre-requisite for reconciliation (Derrida, 2001; Huyse, 2013) and those 
who argue that forgiveness is determinant for reconciliation (Carry, 1998). This research 
suggests that forgiveness is a pre-requisite for full reconciliation. No society can be reconciled 
if a decision to move beyond traumatic experience has not been made. Angolans at the 
grassroots level need to forgive past atrocities in order in order to build a harmonious 
community.  
Forgiveness and reconciliation happen within a dialogical context. Members of given 
community have to talk about their history freely. A communication that can flow can inform 
change.  
 
7.5- DIALOGUE AS COMMUNICATION  
 
This research investigated the level of satisfaction of the peace process in Kuito-Bié and Viana. 
Unlike Kuito-Bié where people had first-hand war experience, Viana did not. However, when 
it came to the priority given to dialogue as a way of moving towards full reconciliation, both 
municipalities shared the same sentiments. The majority of respondents agreed that dialogue is 
of paramount importance for the process of reconciliation and sustainable peacebuilding. 
Fisher-Yoshida (2014:879) said the aim of dialogue in conflict transformation is to “change 
the nature of the communication between parties in conflict as they engage in dialogue”.  
The aim of dialogue then is to build effective communication aiming at building mutual trust. 
A truth commission in Angola has to start from creating avenues for encounters and dialogue. 
There are will be no sustainable peace if Angolans do not decide to talk openly to each other. 
It is a process whereby the whole community is engaged and interconnected towards a common 
goal.  
The Angolan conflict left the Angolan population severely hurt. As result sentiments of hurt 
created fear and common distrust. Both the interpersonal and intercommunity relationships are 
deeply affected by the sentiment of anger and bitterness. Dialogue as a process can help 
communities to move forward the roadblock to interconnection in society.  
It is clear that the Angolan peace process needs an integrated framework to address the pending 
issues resulting from the many peace processes. The divided MPLA-UNITA which affects 
relationships at the bottom of the pyramid needs to carefully deal with so that a new era led by 
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grassroots can take placed and the country can move decisively towards sustainable 
reconciliation.  
Altogether, this research confirms that reconciliation is a key concept in post-conflict peace 
building. There will be no peace without reconciliation and forgiveness. The way towards 
reconciliation passes through the restructuring of the current model used in the country. The 
peace process has been a top-down approach due to the nature of the way peace was achieved. 
What is suggested is that peace building should change to bottom-up framework with an 
emphasis at the bottom of the pyramid. As mentioned by Lederach (1995:212): 
“The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict transformation 
must actively envision, include, respect and promote the human cultural resources 
from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses through which we 
do not primarily see the setting and the people in it as the problem and the outsider 
as the answer. Rather, we understand the long term goal of transformation as 
validating and building on people and resources within the setting.” 
The idea is to build peace from the community and with their respective resources. 
Reconciliation and forgiveness are crucial topics from Angola. Through a process of truth 
commissions, communities will be able to come together and discuss the history of the conflict, 
understand the root cause, deal with effects and suggest ways towards a common goal. This 
encounter should be a celebration of difference, where people will see each as different but not 
as enemies. Peace can only unfold though a shared vision for the future.  
As the respondents in Viana and Kuito-Bié showed, peace should be based on dialogue. The 
framework based on dialogue acknowledges that peace can only be sustainable if people agree 
to openly talk about the past and decide to move beyond hindrances reconciliation can be 
possible.  
Although, this research advises for peacebuilding from below as it is preferred approach to 
peace in Angola, it advises that top leaders have to strengthen public institutions and work 
more towards economic equity.   
After the 2002 Peace Agreement, Angolan experienced a flouring economy. With oil prices 
raising from 2008 to 2012 the country had the possibility of creating a more integrated 
economic system. However it did not happen. Rather, personnel enrichment and embezzlement 
of the country´s resources has driven the country into an economic crisis that can further 
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become social unrest. That is why this research advocates for an urgent intervention on 
peacebuilding from below.  
Right from the beginning of the armed conflict in 1975, it was always perceived that the 
Northern part of the country is more privileged than the south, in times of  hunger, the south 
suffer more that the north. The inland provinces, with drought have no possibility of farming 
and as consequence poverty increases. That is why both respondents, that is Kuito-Bié and 
Viana, find it crucial to work towards economic equity.  
The Angolan peace process started in officially in 2002, whatever happened before were failed 
attempts. Since 2002 the peace has been negative. It is more important to move towards 
reconciliation. The current peace is perceived to be negative, based on cease-fire, citizens are 
unhappy with turning of events. The question on level of enjoyment of the current peace shows 
that the current situation leaves a lot to be desired. People’s priorities are the use of dialogue 
as a way of addressing past offences and moving towards reconciliation. Reconciling people 
will have a better sense of security. Currently, there is a culture of fear and intimidation. 
Dissatisfaction cannot be shown publicly as it is taken as opposition to the ruling party.  The 
way towards reconciliation is to free the media, so that people can express themselves and 
voice out their problems. What is really needed in the country is a democratic structure that 
will allow the grassroots to fully participate in their own future as far as peace is concerned. If 
a change does not happen now them the grassroots instead of being peace makers will turn into 
trouble makers.  
Looking at how people in  the post war period have been treated, poor transition, corruption, 
resource-dependency, volatile economy based on oil as the main source of income though 
depended on the international dictates, poor governance, migration to the cities, shows a 
insecurity for the future. The area is just like many African countries which are facing in terms 
of what to do with the young people that seem to demand so much yet there seems to be too 
little – a group who has no idea of what war was like and could easily turn to it because they 
are naïve of its consequences. The stories their parents and grandparents have talked of like, 
“liberation struggles, the civil war victories and the even the early postwar threat of confusion,” 
remains too many in this group just stories that do not make sense (De Oliveira, 2015:217). 
Thus “disruptive political phenomena are bound to emerge” (De Oliveira, 2015:217). 
What the country therefore needs is a more patriotic group that will look at where the country 
has come from, where it is at the moment and where it ought to be where as many as possible 
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can take part in the building of a new Angola. De Oliveira (2015) says that if this is does not 
happen then what could happen is “… populist reactions that marshal ethnic, regional and racial 
resentment, laced with xenophobic sentiment against expatriates, into a rousing critique of 
postwar order” (Oliveira, 2015:217). At this moment this is likely to happen for those who rule 
(the elite). All they do is to dine and wine with the expatriates whose investments or shares 
may be what is running the economy of the country if oil is kept aside.  The rest of the society 
is just busy bodies and noisemakers who have nothing to say about how the country is 
governed. These elite have even failed to learn from history where such comforts with the 
expatriates were the order of the day like Uganda and Cote d’Ivoire (Oliveira, 2015). If this 
does not happen, then those within the slams may resort to gangland violence typical of the 
Latin American cities (De Oliveira, 2015).  
While this is the reality in which the country stands in terms of it challenges, the other reality 
is that tomorrow will not be like today and yesterday. And tomorrow can be better if those in 
a position to give direction are willing and ready to look at the real challenges that are affecting 
the people today. Those who think that the fears of yesterday may make people keep quiet and 
watch things happening yet they go sleep with empty stomachs may be living in a dream land. 
The earlier they wake up from this slumber, the better or else they may not be able to tell their 
dreams tomorrow. And this tomorrow will not be built by few though some would have to 
sacrifice more than others, but it is the work of all Angolans. The beauty that would happen 
tomorrow if the spirit of the people remains the way it is, is that this time round it would not 
begin from the top but from below. The question is, is the country ready to hold such an event? 
And if it was to come, how will those who would want to guard and protect the status quo act? 









7.6- GENERAL CONCLUSION  
  
Peace is about reconciliation. The only possible way to reconcile after long war is to 
acknowledge past wrongs and to move towards a common future. Thus, reconciliation takes 
place in places where human beings acknowledge each other as important for a common 
cause. At the heart of peacebuilding is the realization that as a society, there are common goals 
to achieve and these are “characterized by love, mutual respect and proactive engagement” 
(Lederach, 2005:42). The Angolan peace agreement achieved in 2002 lacks such proactive 
engagement.  
After 27 years of armed conflict, politicians find it hard to work together, UNITA and MPLA 
still see each other with animosity. The cold relationship at the top level leadership affects 
grassroots conviviality. Added to the current problems of social exclusion based on party 
affiliation, is the absence of a clear framework to achieve true peace. This research has showed 
that after the peace agreement in Luena, the only item relating to reconciliation is related to 
amnesty to former war crimes. The pain and hurt of civilians seems to have been less of 
importance and were not considered by those who signed the agreement.  
At the times of these accords, the government’s main agenda was only promoting a forgive 
and forget perspective. As a consequence sensitive issues related to the root causes of the 
conflict were never addressed. And so, in as much as the country is celebrating 14 years of 
cease-fire, the peace is still negative, the road to positive peace is rather still too long.  
This research has delved into the genesis of the Angolan conflict as well as the peace attempts 
in Bicesse and Lusaka. It was found that the reason why the peace accords never worked is 
because the political parties did not trust each other, furthermore, the Troika, who was the 
mediator had hidden agenda for Angola.  
To better understand the feeling of the population, the researcher turned his works to two town 
municipalities in the country, Kuito-Bié and Viana, with an aim of finding out what peoples´ 
expectations have been based on the current peace agreement. What can be concluded is that 
the current peace is disintegrated and negative. The interviewed civilians agree that the 
country needs to move forward as far as peace is concerned. For sustainable peace Angolans 
need to work together towards a common goal. This research gives preference to a bottom up 
approach where more grassroots actors are involved. However, it acknowledges that the top 
leadership have to create necessary conditions for common understanding and avenues for 
better political integration of former enemies.  
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To attain the aim of healthy relationships, the researcher suggests Lederach’s integrated 
framework for peacebuilding. This is because the model presents peace building as a long 
term process, a process that changes dominating structures to collaborative ones. This is 
because today’s peace building endeavour calls for a complete intervention that touches all 
levels of a society. For Lederach (1997:24) peacebuilding “focuses on the restoration and 
rebuilding of relationships and engaging the relational aspects of reconciliation as the central 
component of peacebuilding”. Based on the principles of long term goals for peacebuilding 
this research acknowledges sustainable peace built through respect and the promotion of 
human culture.  
It was clearly observed that the current situation in Angola is on a status of unresolvedness, 
thus there is a need for an agenda to unite people so that those still affected by trauma can 
move forward.  According the interviewee from the Catholic Church, peace in Angola has to 
be thought in the terms of African traditional gatherings, where you have drummers, singers 
and dancers. The dance is only possible if each intervenient plays their role well. If the 
drummers do not play well the singers will fail, so will the dancers. This analogy helps to 
elucidate that for any peace to be successful, a combined effort is necessary for leading to the 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Dear Respondent  
 
My name is Marmiliano Keyse de Oliveira Naufila, a Masters of Arts (MA) student in Political 
Science at University of Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa. I am conducting research on the impact 
of the peace imitative in Angola. This study aims at fulfilling the requirements of a Masters 
Degree Thesis. Given the importance of the study, you are kindly requested to provide critical 
information to make this study a success. Being an academic work there is no money involved 
and your cooperation is voluntary. You may withdraw from participation at any time. 
 
Please be assured that your responses will be acknowledged, credited and used strictly for 
academic purposes only. Information obtained will be treated confidentially.  
 
Thank you for your participation 
 
Marmiliano Naufila  




Gender Age Education     
  None Primary Some Secondary Secondary Complete Tertiary 
 









Your life since the war 
 





Do you have access 
to school for your 
children? 
Do you have 
running water and 
electricity at home? 
Less than 10 
years 
10-15 years 
16 years and 
above 
   
 
Do you feel the positive effects 
of  peace? 
No, not 
at all 
A little Average A lot 
Yes, 
definitely 
Is economic equity a necessary 
path for sustainable peace? 
No, not 
at all 
















War, peace and reconciliation 
 
 











to talk about 
the conflict? 





   
 





Dialogue and its role in community building 
 
Which party do you 
mainly support? 
   
Do you dialogue with 
UNITA militants or vice-
versa? 
UNITA MPLA FNLA None of these  
 
 












Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Political difference is a cause of conflict today  
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 




Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 




Disagree  Neutral Agree 
Agree 
Strongly 
To dialogue is not to agree, but understand 
each other in different ways 
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  Neutral Agree  
Effective dialogue can build community trust 
Disagree 
Strongly  
Disagree  Neutral Agree  
 









Interview Question Schedule   
 
Gender Age Education     








1. Have you been involved in any reconciliation effort, if so what?  
 
 
2. What you think caused the failure of Alvor, Bicesse and Lusaka? 
 
 
3. Luena only dealt with military issues. When will the common citizen engage in dialogue? 
 
 
4. Do you think there are still unresolved issues that can negatively affect the current situation 
of apparent calm? 
 
 
5. Which methods can be used to avoid future armed conflict? 
 
 
6. Are you aware of any system of conflict prevention in the country? 
 
 
7. If there still latent tensions between militants from different parties, how can citizens pass 
beyond party politics? 
 
 
8. There are people who assert that the liberation movements do not serve for the independent 
Angola, do you agree? 
 
 
9. Are you personally involved in any peace initiatives?  
 
